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CURRENT History

MARCH, 1966

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What sort of progress are the new nations of Africa making toward orderly government? What problems do they face? Here, seven articles explore African problems today. Our introductory article examines the four methods used by the African states to maintain peace and stability and points out that "Africa's means of keeping security and order . . . remains ad hoc and unsystematic, with large gaps and discontinuities in its machinery."

Cooperation for Order in Africa

By VERNON MCKAY

*Director of the Program of African Studies,
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THE ETHIOPIAN capital of Addis Ababa is the busy headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), Africa's young and active counterpart of the Organization of American States.¹ The O.A.U.'s earnest endeavors to foster African unity and order are impressive, particularly when viewed in the context of the obstacles confronting African leaders today. Africa's statesmen are pragmatic, however, and aware of the O.A.U.'s limitations. They have therefore utilized four different international and regional mechanisms for maintaining security and order: the O.A.U., the United Nations, the bilateral defense agreements which 13 African states maintain with great powers, and the bilateral security arrangements made by certain African states with each other. The mechanism best suited to deal with each

crisis is used. When viewed as a whole, these arrangements might be considered an international *ad hoc* system for maintaining security and order in Africa.

Before assessing the operation of these four African security subsystems, it is imperative to analyze the environment in which they operate and the types of problems that confront them. Pan-Africanism, like all Pan movements, symbolizes a dream of unity. But the states of Africa will soon number 40 or more, while the state systems of the Americas, Asia and Europe each contain only about 20 states. The tasks of building unity and maintaining order in Africa are in some ways the most complex of all. Not only are African states more numerous and extremely varied, but most of them are quite small in population and economically weak. Their arms and armies, with few exceptions, are so small and inexperienced that these states sometimes have difficulty in maintaining order and security inside their own borders. Only

¹ The author is indebted to Chester A. Crocker for research assistance in the preparation of this article. Mr. Crocker is a Ph.D. student in the Program of African Studies at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

four of them were independent 15 years ago; 27 of them are less than six years old.

The state structures inherited from the colonial powers are quite fragile. Many of Africa's leaders have to spend a high proportion of their time on the primary tasks of keeping themselves in office and creating a sense of nationhood. Moreover, the new states were born during one of the most turbulent periods in history, a time of struggle between the Western and Communist worlds, which has had divisive repercussions on African ideologies.

INTER-AFRICAN CONFLICTS

To these general problems of the post-colonial era of transition must be added several specific issues that threaten the peace of Africa. At the top of the list is the danger of growing conflict along racial lines between the independent African states and the territories and states of southern Africa that remain under white minority control—the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa. The continuing polarization of attitudes about this “white redoubt” threatens to undermine hopes for rational discussion, negotiation, compromise, and peaceful change.

The conflicting ideologies of black and white nationalisms tend to overshadow the legitimate claims of both sides. Military budgets in Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa have increased enormously within the last five years; nationalists in exile have been trained in guerrilla warfare techniques and subversion; normal relations between South Africa and Portugal on the one hand, and black Africa on the other have been severely reduced; and most recently, Anglo-American sanctions have been imposed against Rhodesia, where the white minority declared independence from Britain on November 11, 1965. Emotion and ideology have so internationalized the conflict that it could lead eventually to much greater intervention by the United Nations and the great powers.

Conflicts among African states north of the Zambezi add to Africa's problems. This area has been the scene of numerous diplo-

matic incidents and hostilities, although examples of actual warfare are rare. Fighting on the Algerian-Moroccan border and the Ethiopian-Somali border are the primary examples; lesser skirmishes have taken place elsewhere. The spirit of interstate behavior embodied in the O.A.U. Charter of May, 1963, limits the use of war as an instrument of change. Nonetheless, border disputes, irredentism, leadership rivalries, and interstate subversion are continuing sources of friction.

Aid from one African state to insurgent opposition forces inside another has been the most common threat to African harmony. The possibility of border disputes and irredentism remains a potential threat, but African leaders have wisely recognized the need to legitimize the artificial borders imposed by the European states. They have sanctified the territorial status quo in the O.A.U. Charter and elsewhere, thus giving present borders the support of international law. For the most part they have respected this commitment.

The most widespread disruptions of order are local troubles inside each state; in fact, only a handful of African states have thus far avoided some form of antigovernment plot, *coup d'état*, mutiny, or assassination. This extensive pattern of internal disorder has many causes, but the primary factor is opposition to the process by which incumbent political elites are gradually consolidating their control. Opposition comes from the conservative traditional forces and the modernizing radicals in student groups and labor unions. Often it is a question of the political “outs” versus the “ins.”

Such conflicts are a serious threat to order because of the scarcity of those stabilizing institutions and structures that help older states to maintain continuity. Governments have been easily isolated and overturned by a few armed men on several occasions in West Africa's small French-speaking states; in East Africa the mutiny in Tanganyika's 2,000-man army in January, 1964, left the future of President Julius Nyerere's regime in doubt for nearly a week. African leaders are acutely

aware of their vulnerability; they attempt to counter the opposition by strengthening the single party system and by using international forums to condemn internal subversion and violence as political techniques.

There is little hope that internal strife will disappear from African politics in the near future. Opposition elements will continue to foment violence rather than join the increasingly closed political systems of one-party states that do not tolerate open criticism and competition for high office. The ability of opposition groups to continue to fight is bolstered by support from neighboring states which may offer assistance ranging from political asylum to the training and arming of insurgents.

Aid to insurgents in a neighboring country is an obvious foreign policy instrument that is not likely to be renounced solely on moral grounds. Its motives—ideological conflict between governments, tribal sympathy for suppressed ethnic minorities, leadership drives on the Pan-African stage, or strategic considerations—are too complex. It was just this issue of assisting rebel groups which threatened to wreck the October, 1965, summit meeting of the O.A.U. in Accra; many French-speaking states accuse Ghana of harboring exile political movements.

With such background in mind, an examination follows of the use African leaders have made of their four mechanisms for maintaining stability and order: the O.A.U., the United Nations, defense agreements with great powers, and bilateral arrangements between African states.

THE O.A.U.

The O.A.U., founded in 1963 after more than two years of rivalry and controversy among the diplomatic alignments known as the Casablanca, Monrovia-Lagos, and Brazzaville groups,² includes every independent

state except South Africa.³ Although disrupted by the militant ideology and tactics of its most radical members, it derives strength from its universality and the constant striving for consensus by its Secretariat and other able African leaders. Articles II and III of the 33 articles in the O.A.U. Charter define its "purposes" and "principles" in broad terms. Article II provides that "Member States shall coordinate and harmonize" their policies of cooperation in a wide variety of fields, including "defense and security."

In Article III, the signatories declare their adherence to seven principles which merit repeating because of their direct relevance to the theme under discussion:

1. the sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
4. peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State;
6. absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent;
7. affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

The O.A.U. has created numerous subsidiary commissions, but its main work until the end of 1965 was done at three annual assemblies of heads-of-state and governments, and at four ordinary and six extraordinary sessions of its Council of Ministers. At these 13 meetings more than 125 resolutions were adopted. Although they are too numerous and complex for detailed summary, they reveal the following major O.A.U. interests: liberating southern Africa from colonialism and *apartheid* (33 resolutions), United Nations matters (16 resolutions), African border disputes (11 resolutions), disarmament (6 resolutions), and economic cooperation (5 resolutions). Nearly 20 other wide-ranging subjects dealing with African cooperation are covered in the remaining resolutions.

² The Casablanca group includes Morocco, Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea and Mali. The larger Monrovia group includes the Brazzaville group of 12 formerly French states south of the Sahara, plus, among others, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and the Congo-Leopoldville.

³ Ed. note: and newly-independent Rhodesia.

These actions of Africa's most prestigious forum are clearly a deterrent to offenders. Moreover, the O.A.U. has also established a commission of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration the details of which are spelled out in a protocol of 33 articles signed at Cairo on July 21, 1964. Although this formal machinery had not been used by the end of 1965, an *ad hoc* commission was established in November, 1963, to deal with an Algerian-Moroccan border war. Through the commission's efforts, the direct mediation of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Modibo Keita of Mali brought an end to the shooting.

Strong pressure by other O.A.U. organs during border disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, Kenya and Somalia, and Ghana and Upper Volta also had favorable results. The moral sanction against border revisionism was strengthened at Cairo in 1964 when the states of Africa pledged themselves to "respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence."

The O.A.U. has been less successful in dealing with the key problem of subversion by African states against one another. The most flagrant example of subversion, rebellion, and internal chaos is the case of the Congo-Leopoldville. The internal disorders and especially the aid given to rebel factions in the civil war of 1964 by Burundi and the Congo-Brazzaville were the subject of an O.A.U. resolution [ECM/Res. 5 (III)]; a 9-state conciliation commission under President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya was created in September, 1964. Little came of its efforts, however.

O.A.U. AND THE EAST AFRICAN MUTINIES

The internal disorders that broke out in East Africa early in 1964 are a particularly interesting example of Africa's *ad hoc* approach to inter-African cooperation on military matters. Nearly simultaneous mutinies in the armies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika challenged the authority of the three governments, especially in Tanganyika. Swift military intervention by Britain at the request of the African governments restored order

but not before the position of President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika had been gravely weakened for a time.

In order to draw African attention to the problem posed by such disorders, President Nyerere called an extraordinary session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers at Dar es Salaam on February 12-15, 1964. The Council of Ministers adopted a pragmatic resolution [ECM/Res. 2 (II)] which simply noted "the decision" of Tanganyika to replace British troops with Africans, and proposed that Tanganyika "should have the right to choose" from which of the African states to ask for "at the most, three battalions of African troops and an air wing." Tanganyika thus obtained beforehand O.A.U. endorsement for a military aid request to Ethiopia (which sent an air squadron) and to Nigeria (which sent its Third Battalion of troops). The replacement of British troops thus set a precedent for inter-African military cooperation. It is doubtful, however, that this step would have been possible if the mutinous troops in Tanganyika represented genuine political discontent, especially if the rebels had had the opportunity to establish contacts in neighboring states.

U.N. ACTION IN THE CONGO

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the United Nations as an international mechanism for maintaining order and security in Africa; the United Nations has been used only in the Congo. It might appear that four years of United Nations action in the Congo had few permanent results; violence broke out on the largest scale that unhappy country has ever known just months after the United Nations military presence was withdrawn. This has led some observers to question the benefits of United Nations action in a country where security and authority structures have broken down and the international organization is, in effect, forced to run the country.

The United Nations mission was torn between its legal obligation to respect the sovereignty and independence of the Congo and the practical necessity to take vital de-

cisions of a political and administrative character to avert chaos. It was never clear whether the United Nations had the authority to disarm dissident groups. The apolitical nature of the mandate given the United Nations obligated it to support the central government without interfering in internal affairs. When it did act in behalf of the central government, its neutrality was seriously compromised in the view of certain states which supported Patrice Lumumba's rebel government in Stanleyville. Some states withdrew their support as a result. This reemphasized the United Nations dependence on the active cooperation of the great powers; in fact the mission would have been crippled but for the firm support of the United States. African states, which had placed great hope in the United Nations mission, then divided along varied factional lines reflecting the internal division in the Congo. The United Nations became an arena of factional bickering between African states.

Although the crisis could have been worse without United Nations action, the Congo operations of the United Nations were at best a mixed blessing. The United Nations proved to be a poor second to effective governmental authority. African states have been cautious about advocating an expanded role for the United Nations in Africa. They are adamant that Africans should have an important voice in determining how, when, and where the United Nations should exercise a security function in Africa. In particular, Africans want more voting power in United Nations councils, and want the United Nations to use African troops in any future peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Two states that have attempted to bring African disputes to the United Nations—Somalia and Morocco—have done so because they knew their causes were unpopular and would not be supported by the O.A.U. majority. Prospects for a growing United Nations role in ensuring African peace and security are therefore quite limited, at least for the present. An important exception to this generalization could conceivably come in case of clashes between independent Afri-

can states and the white redoubt of southern Africa. For example, if violence breaks out along the borders of Rhodesia, the O.A.U. might prove incapable of providing the necessary force and authority, thus leaving the door open for United Nations action.

BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS

The third international mechanism used by Africans to maintain order and security is provided for in 13 defense agreements with great powers. France has signed defense accords with 11 of its former colonies in black Africa, either on a direct bilateral basis or on a regional basis with groups of states. France has assumed certain responsibilities for both the national defense and the internal order of these states (Dahomey, Gabon, Chad, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Togo, Niger, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Senegal) and is permitted to station troops on African territory.

In most cases, the accords provide that the African state may call on France to provide assistance for the "internal and external defense" of the country, but French officials have insisted that this arrangement has created "neither a right for Africans nor a duty for France." French troops have been used in Africa only in cases involving internal disorders, and the French have usually been cautious in their use of force. If French troops could be automatically called in by any regime, France could be accused rightly of propping up unpopular status quo elites, a charge heard after French paratroops restored President Leon Mba of Gabon to power in February, 1964. France has greatly reduced the number of French troops stationed in Africa (from 27,800 in 1964 to under 7,000 by the end of 1965), but there is no indication that it intends to shed its African military commitments. An entire division in France has been earmarked for quick deployment in African and other emergencies.

No other non-African state has a military role comparable to that of France in Africa. British intervention in East Africa in Janu-

ary, 1964, was of great importance but it was completely *ad hoc*; there are no defense accords between Britain and any middle African state. Britain's only remaining defense responsibility is in Libya, which dates from a 1953 treaty that has never been called into action. However, the presence of British forces in Libya has been of internal and external significance in supporting the ruling Sanusi dynasty. The only other defense agreement of this type is the 1959 treaty between the United States and Liberia, which also has never been called into action.

INTER-AFRICAN ARRANGEMENTS

Bilateral military cooperation between African states is rare, but two examples provide an indication of the circumstances under which it can take place. Several African states with Saharan areas have difficulty in administering and controlling nomadic tribesmen. Since the nomads constitute for the most part a troublesome minority, governments have a common interest in bringing them under control. This and other factors were behind the unheralded military cooperation of Mali and Algeria during the first half of 1964 at a time when Mali was attempting to subdue a rebellion of Tuareg nomads. By attempting to seal off the southern border, Algerian authorities helped Mali to suppress the rebellion rapidly. This removed a potential cause of friction that might have embittered relations between the two countries.

A more important example is the reported defense pact signed between Kenya and Ethiopia in June, 1963, the terms of which have not been made public. In this case the two states apparently decided to combine against a common threat: Somalia's irredentist claim to large parts of Ethiopia and Kenya. However, this alliance did not foster peace and security in the Horn of Africa. It stimulated Somalia's search for allies outside Africa which led to the signing of a \$30 million military assistance accord with the Soviet Union in November, 1963. The alliance pattern in the Horn of Africa was thus enlarged beyond the immediate states involved in the dispute. The Kenya-Ethiopia

pact represents the normal reaction of nation-states to a perceived common threat, and may be indicative of a future trend.

PROSPECTS

Africa's means of ensuring security and order thus remains *ad hoc* and unsystematic, with large gaps and discontinuities in its machinery. Despite the widespread recognition of the need for much greater inter-African military cooperation, the new and inexperienced O.A.U. is still weak in resources and ideologically divided. At the Accra summit meeting in October, 1965, Secretary-General Diallo Telli warned that members had contributed less than half of their assessments for the annual \$4.4 million budget; members also had sponsored more conferences than the organization could handle and then failed to attend them all.

Ghana has repeatedly called for the establishment of an African military high command. Its efforts have been no more successful than earlier initiatives by the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups to erect a viable interstate military organization. At its second session in February, 1965, however, the de-

(Continued on page 178)

Vernon McKay has belonged to many United States delegations to sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and Trusteeship Council. He has made numerous trips to Africa. From 1936 to 1945, he taught history at Syracuse University; from 1945 to 1948 he was a Research Associate writing on African problems for the Foreign Policy Association. He joined the Department of State in 1948 where he worked on African issues in the United Nations until 1956. Since 1962 he has been Chairman of the State Department's Advisory Council on African Affairs. Author of *Africa in World Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) and editor and co-author of *African Diplomacy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), he is a former president of the African Studies Association, and was a member of the United States National Commission for UNESCO from 1960 to 1966.

The Nations of Africa



—Map by Russell Lenz. Map reprinted by permission from The Christian Science Monitor. © 1965 by The Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

KEY: At the beginning of this century Liberia and Ethiopia were the only independent countries in Africa. By 1965, only the areas in black were not fully independent. In November, 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence from Britain, an act not recognized by the United States as of early 1966.

What are the special problems of the North African states? What is their relationship to the rest of Africa?

Africa's Arab Fringe

By HALFORD L. HOSKINS

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The American University*

THE FIVE STATES occupying the northern littoral of Africa have not been viewed as African in a continental sense until recently. Set off from the rest of Africa by the vast expanse of the Sahara desert and facing outward across the Mediterranean, an inland sea, the historical relationship of these countries with the peoples occupying the greater part of the continent has been almost nonexistent. Technological change—radio communication and facile transportation by air—and the relatively sudden upsurge of a host of newly independent states in the heart of Africa, vociferously intent on bringing their existence and their not inconsiderable problems to the notice of the world at large, have made the countries of the Mediterranean fringe conscious of their African setting.

For both geographical and historical reasons, the states of the Mediterranean littoral have had more in common with one another than with other states of the continent. All are mainly Arabic in language and Islamic in religion. All, for various periods of time, came under the control of one or another of the European powers. All have achieved independence in recent years. There, however, the principal likenesses cease. Differences in character, in geographical position, in demographic composition and in economic

resources separate these states more clearly than their political boundaries do.

Egypt, for example, is the Asian gateway to Africa, a circumstance that gives it the character of keystone in the Arab arch. Its peasant population—the *fellahin*—are as unlike the peasantry elsewhere in North Africa as the Valley of the Nile differs from other sections of the Mediterranean fringe. Likewise Egypt's Greek, Coptic, Nubian, Turkish and even Arab elements are not matched elsewhere. The countries of the Maghreb¹ differ markedly not only from Egypt but even from each other with respect both to physical characteristics and to proportions of Arab, Berber, Negro, European and other—often unidentifiable—population components. Certainly it has not been consistency in continental location, size, soil and water, or the character of their human elements that has brought about proposals for North African unity from time to time, from one source or another.

MOROCCO

Morocco has contributed its own peculiar problems to the African Maghreb. Among these have been constitutional questions regarding the degree of authority to be retained by the king, and even—at times—questions concerning the continued existence of the monarchy. The political shrewdness of Hassan II, who issued an acceptable constitutional charter in June, 1961, and who has chosen to identify himself with popular

¹ The term "Maghreb," literally "the West," is conventionally used for the region of North Africa west of Egypt where Islam penetrated and Arab culture and language are dominant.

causes, appears to have submerged the voices of those who would have set up a republic upon the death of revered King Mohammed II in 1961.

Prominent among the nation's problems in recent years have been issues of an economic nature. The failure of foreign concessionaires to find oil and gas in commercial quantities, after exhaustive search, denied Morocco the opportunity to pursue as independent a course of action in international affairs as presumably would have otherwise been the case. A particularly bitter disappointment was the action of France—applauded by Tunisia—in insisting on an independent role for autonomous Saharan Mauretania, to which Morocco had both historical and religious claims. Although nearly destitute of population, this dependency possesses a single mountain of high grade iron ore which may well prove to be as valuable as major oil deposits.

Other developments have brought economic hardship to Morocco. The devaluation of the French franc in 1959 resulted in the flight from Morocco of an estimated \$80 million in capital. The exodus of large numbers of French *colons* after Moroccan independence in 1956 and the subsequent emigration of at least 150,000 Sephardic Jews, mainstays of Moroccan business, were depressants on the economy. Just as serious in short-term effects, although a source of satisfaction to many nationalists, was the withdrawal of United States personnel from bases acquired under the French protectorate and developed at a cost of some \$400 million. While the bases themselves have been of little value to Morocco except for possible use as educational centers, the departure of free-spending Americans and the consequent unemployment of thousands of Moroccans amounted to a total annual loss of not less than \$60 million. Even the withdrawal in

stages of French and Spanish armed forces added to a difficult financial situation.

These circumstances would have been more serious except for the availability of foreign aid. Relatively massive foreign assistance aided recovery from the destruction of Agadir by earthquake in March, 1960. In that year, United States provision of more than \$73 million in budgetary support helped to bring a moderate tone to an uneasy government. In the following years, Moroccan sentiment vacillated between East and West, depending partly on the amounts and character of the assistance supplied by the Soviet Union and the United States and partly on the fortunes of the Moroccan government in the promotion of the so-called Casablanca² group of North African states as a counterpoise to the Brazzaville bloc.³

In the early months of 1962, France and Morocco, previously on poor terms over numerous issues, embarked on a new relationship of close cooperation including a marked increase in French economic aid. The several agreements resulting from this entente plus the action of the World Bank and its related institution, the International Finance Corporation, in promoting the development of Moroccan industry can be credited to a large extent with introducing a new measure of stability into Moroccan affairs and with establishing closer cultural relations with France—a matter of prime interest to the 160,000 French resident in Morocco. This large portion of the Maghreb thus has come to be regarded as Western-oriented and as having safely passed the nadir of its fortunes. Its growing influence in North African affairs has been marked during the last two years by the satisfactory ending of all outstanding differences with other members of the North African group and by considerably heightened prestige.

TUNISIA

The approach of the French protectorate of Tunisia to independence and the nature of its internal and external problems in late years have not been wholly unlike those of Morocco. Examined in particular, the simi-

² The Casablanca group, including Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic, was formed in January, 1961.

³ The Brazzaville bloc, including 12 French-speaking Africa states (Malagasy, Mauritania, Senegal, and the Entente and Equatorial states) was formed in December, 1960.

larity disappears, for Tunisia has a distinctly individualistic record. An understanding of its behavior relates to the character of its population of three and a half million, including one-fourth of a million Europeans, whose intelligentsia are the most sophisticated of any elements in the Maghreb. Moreover, the Tunisia of today to a remarkable extent is the product of one man, Habib Bourguiba. In him, France might have found a useful friend. Bourguiba was educated at the Sorbonne, married to a French wife, and not indisposed to consider the French point of view relative to North Africa. French authorities, however, with almost unexampled obtuseness, chose to imprison and then to oppose their potential ally until, with the failure of their methods, Tunisia was accorded independence in March, 1956. Replacing an anachronistic monarchy, Bourguiba has guided the nation through its years of adolescence.

Not least among the issues that confronted the Tunisian republic was its imperfect independence. In 1956, French troops still remained in Tunisia, France still held the key naval base at Bizerte, and Tunisia suffered indignities from French efforts to crush Algerian rebel forces. Under pressure, French army forces were withdrawn in 1958, but demands that the Bizerte base also be relinquished were ignored. Encouraged by delegates from 30 African countries attending the African Peoples' Congress in Tunis in January, 1960, Bourguiba declaimed: "It is by liberating Tunisia from colonialism that we are participating in the real independence of Africa."

In the following month word came from the United States that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization no longer required French retention of the Bizerte base. Faced with French intransigence, Bourguiba openly aided the Algerian rebel cause and finally authorized an armed attack on the French-held base. This failed to dislodge the French, but it did bring the Bizerte issue into international prominence. The secretary-general of the Arab League said: "The entire Arab world is gathering around Tunisia." The

United Arab Republic, with which Tunisia had been on extremely poor terms, announced the sending of "total support and unreserved assistance" to its "sister" republic. Moscow granted Tunisia a ruble credit valued at \$27.75 million. The Afro-Asian bloc made a formal bid at the United Nations and without a dissenting voice the General Assembly asked France to give up the Bizerte base.

Tunisia's final independence was achieved at not inconsiderable cost. The two-month shut-down of the pipeline linking Algeria's Edjele oilfield with the Tunisian port of La Skirra, closed to deny oil to France, cost the Tunisian government an estimated \$3.6 million in royalties at a time when the country was suffering from the worst drought in 20 years. Tunisia's normal trade deficit doubled. Only massive doses of United States aid enabled the state to continue to function with a degree of normality. Nevertheless, in July, 1962, a year after the attack on Bizerte, France began transferring to Tunisia \$200 million worth of installations at the Bizerte base in anticipation of complete withdrawal. Other financial aid from the United States Agency for International Development and the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, coupled with a strict Tunisian austerity program, carried the country through the period of crisis. In August, 1963, agreements between France and Tunisia reactivated a flow of French aid that had been cut off in 1957 because of Tunisian support of the Algerian rebellion.

The Bizerte crisis was not the last of Tunisian difficulties. Within the past two years, there have been difficulties with France over the nationalization of French-owned agricultural properties in Tunisia and with Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser over Bourguiba's recommendation of Arab coexistence with Israel. Yet an accord was reached with Algeria for the joint use of Saharan gas and petroleum; Tunisia agreed to participate in the project for an all-African development bank; and measures were adopted at a meeting in Tunis in October, 1964, looking toward unity in economic matters of the four nations of the Maghreb. Bourguiba's image as a

symbol of political moderation in North Africa was scarred, but it still shines brightly in the Maghreb.

LIBYA

Libya, now considered to be a part of the Maghreb, is a phenomenon. When independence was thrust upon it in 1951 by the United Nations, Libya was considered to be the poorest country in the world. As recently as five years ago, it was hardly more than a political hiatus in North Africa. Of its 740,000 square miles, 95 per cent was desert. Its million inhabitants, mostly farmers and herdsmen, eked out a bare living in the coastal areas. Even the modest income received by the state from British and American bases—reminders of World War II—was applied solely to the clumsy administrative machinery devised by a patriarchal monarchy for bringing some unity into the governance of three wholly dissimilar territories—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan.

Then came oil. Exports, which began in 1961, now amount to more than a million barrels a day, placing Libya eighth among the oil-exporting countries. Libya may move further up the scale as discoveries continue, if oil legislation can be restricted to reasonable limits. With annual oil revenues now above the \$500 million level, the untutored Libyan government is a current illustration of the adage that the appetite grows with feeding. It has yet to learn that an oil industry is not a solution to every need and that it does not necessarily obviate poverty. The problems of a people almost wholly illiterate a short span of years ago and now distracted by a view of all the trappings of modern civilized life can only be imagined. In these circumstances, some of the problems lead to somber speculation about the future.

How the oil industry, developed by Western enterprise, will fare in such an environment is uncertain. Some doubt as to the dependability of the Libyan government was created by an unexpected amendment to the law on oil agreements in 1961. A government decree issued late in 1965, apparently intended to bring Libyan regulations into

line with those obtaining in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, may restrict Libyan output materially. Adding to the apprehension of oilmen have been the machinations of Egypt's Nasser relative to Western bases. These suggest that, lacking great income from Egyptian oil resources, Nasser may be planning to acquire a dominant influence over Libyan oil once the Libyan government is no longer in the hands of aging King Idris II.

Egyptian influence pervades Libya. Having practically no teachers of its own, Libya has willingly accepted instructors from Egypt. It follows that with hundreds of Egyptian teachers and professors and dozens of Egyptian administrators in Libyan schools and with relatively many advanced students enrolled in universities at Alexandria and Cairo, pro-Nasser sentiment generally prevails. It is significant, too, that—in the absence of Libyan competition—the calculated broadcasts of Radio Cairo fill an ideological vacuum for adults. Among the results has been the growth of sentiment against the presence of bases assigned to Great Britain and the United States until the years 1973 and 1971 respectively. The willingness of both Western nations to consider the earlier surrender of their concessions, instead of enlisting public approval, only has inspired diatribes in the native press against the "imperialists."

ALGERIA

Algeria is the last country to have won independence in the Maghreb. There was little similarity between the Algerian struggle and the moves for independence in Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria had been under French military control after 1830 and after 1848 had been regarded as a part of metropolitan France. French colonization in Algeria had been an official, not incidental, process; thus, at the beginning of the Algerian revolt—a civil war from some points of view—the European element constituted ten per cent of the entire population. Indeed, there might have been no rebellion but for the fact that French requirements for citizenship in the Algerian *département* discriminated against Muslims

in their home country. Besides, the educated Muslim could hardly accept the fact that, after a century and a quarter of French rule and "assimilation," nearly 95 per cent of the higher administrative posts were held by persons of French extraction. The Algerian problem was political rather than economic: Algeria today could not manage well without French economic aid and income from French oil interests in the Sahara.

The war for independence, beginning late in 1954, is a most dismal story. It need be noted here only that French President Charles de Gaulle became convinced of its futility and worked out the details of Algerian independence at Evian. Only in March, 1962, did the war end, with many details still pending. Beyond a few statistics, the real cost of Algerian independence cannot be indicated. The cost included some 250,000 Muslim lives. Another quarter of a million persons left the country as refugees. Not less than two and a half millions in Algeria were unemployed at the end of the war. Among the early tasks assumed by Algerian Premier Ahmed Ben Bella were the patching up of boundary difficulties with Morocco, the concluding of economic arrangements with France, and the defining of neutralism in Ben Bella's terms. This last might well have been the product of the Afro-Asian summit conference scheduled to meet in Algiers in June, 1965—and touted in advance as a "second Bandung." The overthrow of left-leaning, subversive Ben Bella by his more moderate one-time associate, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, intervened decisively, however, and the conference ended before it began. Many aspects of the succeeding Algerian administration are not yet well known, but the evidence of early months suggests the presence of a stable, hardheaded and practical group, concerned more with the welfare of Algeria than with adventures elsewhere.

EGYPT

Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1954, Egyptian leadership of the states of the Arab world has grown. To a greater extent,

also, since his rise to power, Gamal Abdel Nasser has been the architect of Egyptian policy. In order to maintain a position of such responsibility and prominence, he has been compelled to attempt to keep in balance the elements of his composite personality. That is to say, he has had to adjust his not inconsiderable personal ambition to the circumstances encountered from time to time and yet to be reasonably consistent in his fundamental aims. This necessity has involved some of the most complicated situations with which leaders ever have had to deal. Almost inevitably Nasser has made mistakes, for naturally he has not always recognized or correctly estimated all of the factors in the situations he encountered. On occasion, too, he may well have overestimated his ability to obtain desired results with the means at hand. Nevertheless, he has been a principal agent in the course of developments in world affairs, even though a final assessment of the nature and worth of his accomplishments lies with the future.

Possessing no studied program for action prior to his assumption of authority, Nasser necessarily proceeded with administration on an *ad hoc* basis. There is no reason to believe, however, that his basic wishes have ever changed materially. From the outset, he has desired to improve substantially the conditions of the masses living in the Nile Valley; to promote the unity of the Arab peoples with Egypt at the forefront; and to exercise as much influence as possible in the reshaping of the international environment with which Egypt and the Arab world necessarily is particularly concerned. His personal ambition has been bound up with these aims. Among his principal shortcomings has been the belief that a good end justified the means employed in its attainment. Thus not infrequently his image has suffered from the use of dubious means, especially when these have not succeeded.

The challenge to the Nasser regime involved in the raising of the domestic standard of living was of no ordinary dimension. Egypt, with a population of approximately 30 million, mostly agriculturists, has a popu-

lation density of some 1,900 per square mile in the habitable portion of a state embracing a total of 386,000 square miles. With an annual population increase approaching three per cent, even the completion of the Aswan High Dam can be only temporarily palliative. The effectiveness of a program of birth control cannot be assured so long as peasant women visit the countryside clinics intent on learning not how to have fewer children but how to have more. Any improvement in the standard of living for most Egyptians must be sought principally in the elimination of waste, including such enterprises as military operations in Yemen (reportedly requiring the participation of 40,000 troops) and in the increase of industry and trade.

ARAB SOCIALISM

Some of these problems have been approached through a program of "Arab socialism"—a non-Marxist blend of capitalism and state socialism. This was seriously put to the test with the introduction in 1960 of the second Five Year Plan, looking toward a more systematic nationalization of big business and the development of heavy industry. Results are not yet clear. In the first place, it has been found impossible to stop the flight abroad of private capital. In the second place, care has had to be taken, in the acceptance of foreign aid directly or indirectly applicable to industry, to make sure of its proportions among available sources in the two ideological blocs, in such manner as to enable Egypt to maintain its attitude of positive neutralism or political nonalignment essential to the success of other features of Egyptian policy. In the third place, the marketing of surplus agricultural, industrial and mineral products at worthwhile prices has posed perennial problems, some of them political.

In principle, Nasser always has looked with favor on trends toward unity in the Arab world. This was apparent in his willingness to make an effort at political union with Syria in a United Arab Republic, and in his relations with Yemen and Jordan and Iraq as well as with the countries of the Maghreb.

His efforts to end British control of Aden likewise can be attributed to pan-Arabism, whatever truth may attach to the charge that his eventual aim is to establish a hold on Persian Gulf oil resources.

Egyptian activity in the Maghreb beyond the confines of Libya, other than support for the rebel cause in Algeria, has been moderate. Nasser's encouragement for pan-Arabism in the Maghreb undoubtedly has been diluted somewhat by his growing interest in the newer states south of the Sahara. His participation in pan-African affairs has been augmented by the failure of some undertakings in the Arab world—notably by the breakup of the union with Syria.

Nevertheless, his African concentration has been deepened by the discovery that Israel has embarked on a systematic attempt to penetrate Africa through close economic relations with the nations rising to independence. That the Israelis, with their technical expertise and political sophistication, might win the hearts and minds of African peoples sufficiently to undo the ban on Israel's transit of the Suez Canal and to strengthen imperialistic influence in the heart of the continent was a chilling possibility to a leader intent on guiding independent Africa into a neutralist bloc. This will account, in the main, for Egypt's presence in the numerous African organizations in late years and the frequent meetings of African groups in Cairo. Under the Egyptian monarchy, Cairo was a cosmopolitan city: under Nasser, it has become an international capital.

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Discussing the problems that have plagued the Sudan since independence 10 years ago, this authority succinctly points out that "... the presence of two contrasting culture groups, an Arabic-speaking Muslim North and a Christian or pagan South, has inhibited the establishment of a unified nation-state."

The Sudan: Arab-African Confrontation

By N. MANFRED SHAFFER

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IN MANY parts of the African continent, national unity and economic progress are threatened by racial and religious antagonism or by tribal divisiveness. The Republic of the Sudan, independent since January, 1956, has been the battleground for what could become the most savage racial conflict on the continent.

The Republic of the Sudan, largest of all African countries, has an area of nearly one million square miles—larger than the area of the United States west of the Continental Divide. The first official census of the Sudan, in 1956, reported a total population of 10,262,536; with an estimated annual rate of increase of about 2.8 per cent, there are probably almost 14 million Sudanese in 1966.

The Republic may be divided into two fairly distinct population groups, the Arab-speaking North and the African South. The two have little feeling or affinity for one another. The Arab-aculturated Northerners often exhibit contempt for their Southern compatriots, and "share that attitude to Africa (or Africans) which springs from Islam and is common to the Arabs—a sense of superiority combined with missionary zeal part religious, part political."¹

Is the Sudan an African or an Arab coun-

try? Most regard it as an Arab country because of the dominant role played by the Arab community in internal and international politics. But the question is not so easily answered. If all Arab tribes, and the Beja, Nubijin and other groups were taken together and called Northerners, and if the Nuba and Westerners were combined with the Southerners, there would be, on the basis of the 1956 census, 100 Arab Northerners to every 98 Africans. The birth rate of the former group is 43 per 1,000 and of the latter 59; the death rates are 15 and 22 respectively. Due to the higher rate of natural increase, the majority of Africans over Arabs has been increasing at approximately 50,000 persons per year.² If, in the 1956 census, the 165,000 Westerners counted among the foreigners had been added to Southerners, then the Arabs would have been in the minority.

The Sudan must be considered as part of the Arab World of its northern neighbors as well as the African World to the south and west—but it cannot be wholly identified with either. If language is used as the criterion, then there is still little change in the Arab-African ratio as the census noted that 51 per cent of the population was Arabic-speaking, there being no major second language group. It is almost impossible to use religion as a basis for division since, for example, about 90 per cent of Southern chiefs and their families are now considered Muslims, irrespective of

¹ Colin Legum, ed., *Africa, Handbook to the Continent* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 99.

² *The Population of the Sudan* (Khartoum: Philosophical Society of Sudan, 1958), p. 37.

whether they were infidels or Christians prior to the Call.

THE LAND

Physiographically the Sudan is, in generalized terms, a succession of belts running from west to east across the country. The northern one-third is desert or semi-desert, largely devoid of population except for minor oases and the settled population along the banks of the Nile above the waters of the Aswan Dam. South of the desert is a belt of sparse grazing land with variable rainfall devoted to semi-nomadic pastoralism. This area extends eastward to the margins of the Red Sea. Parallel and south of this is a broad region of steppe and savanna, in which are found the most developed sections of the Sudan, including the major irrigated areas dependent upon the waters of the Nile, *e.g.*, Gezira.

South of the areas of extensive grazing and irrigation-based agriculture, one encounters a more complex landform region; it is predominantly savanna, either extensive grasslands or, usually, woodlands. In the center of this southernmost region, often likened to a huge shallow basin, is the Sudd—one of the most extensive marshlands in the world. Great masses of floating vegetation find their way into the river courses as well as the Nile itself; eventually they interrupt navigation and cause flooding. The terrain varies from these vast swamps to ranges of mountains on the Congo and Uganda border. Partly because of its remoteness and limited transport facilities, the South has added little to the total economy of the Sudan.

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

In the Sudan land and water are the major resources; agricultural and pastoral activities, the principal occupations. The economy consists of two parts: the money or modern sector, which is based primarily on the production and export of cotton, and the traditional or subsistence sector. Although the latter absorbs most of the land and labor, it

produces for isolated and self-contained communities, and not for commercial markets. In the modern sector, the immediate influence on economic activity and income is the level of cotton earnings. In the subsistence sector, economic activity is governed chiefly by seasonal and geographical variations and by a slow process of integration into the modern economy.

The immediate economic problem is the country's dependence upon a single crop, cotton. Cotton production has been responsible for the nation's economic expansion; it continues to provide over 65 per cent of the foreign exchange. The most important economic "island" is the area of the Gezira Scheme, the first stage of which was opened in May, 1957.³ During the ten-year period, 1955–1965, cotton and cottonseed accounted for over two-thirds of the value of Sudanese exports, the Gezira contributing about 60 per cent of the Sudanese 1964–1965 production of 792,503 bales.

The Gezira accounts for a considerably higher proportion of the value of production because of the high quality of its extra-long staple cotton. The gross cultivable area of the Gezira Scheme is approximately 1.87 million acres with an annual usage of about 525,000 acres, the vast bulk of which is planted to cotton. But revenue from cotton is susceptible to seasonal variation in yield, price changes in the world market, and contraction of its markets as a consequence of competition with synthetic fibers. Gum arabic, peanuts, sesame, livestock and livestock products comprise the only other exports of any significance.

The Sudan has not been blessed with mineral resources such as are to be found in southern and central Africa. Modest reserves of minerals, such as iron ore, salt and copper have been discovered. Commercial mining is limited by lack of cheap fuels for processing the ore, the long and expensive haul by rail to Port Sudan, low or unknown concentrations of ore and the lack of an internal market.

For many years the Sudan was able to register a favorable balance of trade and

³ See Robert O. Collins, "The Independent Sudan," *Current History*, January, 1963, p. 17.

rarely had a budget deficit. Recent dislocations in the political scene and cotton marketing difficulties have resulted in a drop in the foreign reserves from a total of 60 million Sudanese pounds in 1960–1961 to 22 million pounds in 1965; internal reserves fell from 31 million pounds to 2.2 million pounds in the same period. The Southern Sudanese problem is bound to drain further the limited resources of the country.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The modern political history of the Sudan dates from 1820, when conquest by the Macedonian-born Turk, Mohammed Ali, brought the country (within approximately its present-day boundaries) under the control of the Ottoman Empire. By 1881, discontent over the repressiveness and inconsistency of foreign domination was crystallized in the religious fervor and nationalistic appeal of Mahdism.

The Mahdists, in power from 1885 to 1899, led a religious movement, which through indigenous theocratic rule appealed to almost all of the Mahdi's countrymen—the one major exception being the Mirghaniya, whose Islam is more orthodox and less radical. The depredations of the Mahdists, which brought the country to the verge of ruin, ended with their military defeat by British and Egyptian forces at Omdurman in September, 1898.

Between 1899 and 1953, the Sudan was governed under a British-dominated Anglo-Egyptian condominium in which full governing powers were vested in a governor-general appointed by the Egyptians on the recommendation of the British government. The condominium gave to the Sudan a rather unique legal status that long outlived the circumstances that created it. Nevertheless, under the condominium modern concepts of state, education, law, hygiene and economic development were introduced by a body of administrators who were highly skilled and devoted to the people whom they served.

In 1953, the country's first election for an

all-Sudanese government placed in power the National Union Party (N.U.P.), which advocated until early 1955 a policy of Sudanese-Egyptian political unity. Over the next two years, events in both Egypt and the Sudan negated any desire for unification. By December, 1955, Sayed Isma'il al-Azhari, leader of the N.U.P., was able to obtain independence by a parliamentary declaration. On January 1, 1956, the territory became independent and the Republic of the Sudan was established as a parliamentary democracy.

The following month the N.U.P. was forced into a coalition with all the other parties. In July, Abdulla Khalil, secretary-general of the Umma Party, assumed the premiership and the N.U.P. went into opposition. Over the next two years the N.U.P. and Umma, anxious to escape the mounting threat of military rule, were prepared to accept El-Mahdi as president of the Sudan in exchange for the premiership. However, plans for an effective coalition government were swept aside by the military coup of November, 1958.

On November 17, 1958, in a bloodless coup d'état, the Sudanese army assumed power and installed an authoritarian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and a Council of Ministers. It has been claimed that "Prime Minister Abdulla Khalil invited the military to take over in order to prevent a defeat of his coalition government in Parliament."⁴ General Ibrahim Abboud assumed the presidency and was invested with full executive and legislative powers by the Supreme Council.

In October, 1964, growing opposition by different sectors of the population toppled Abboud and the Supreme Council. This recent change must be regarded as a popular revolt in which politicians, trade unionists, civil servants, and students played a very active role. The spontaneity with which a series of events overtook the military regime is second in significance only to the determination with which unarmed civilians stood up to the military. The Council was accused of failing to create an efficient government, of fiscal over-indulgences, ineptness in giving the Sudanese any sense of national purpose and a reluctance

⁴ Mohammed O. Beshir, "The Sudan: A Military Surrender," *Africa Report*, December, 1964, pp. 3–6. Also see Helen Kitchen, "The Sudan in Transition," *Current History*, July, 1959.

to come to grips with problems in the southern Sudan.

Thus, on October 26, 1964, President Aboud dissolved the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. A transitional government was formed under the premiership of Sayed Sirr el-Khalifa, a highly respected, non-political official of the ministry of education. Collective responsibility for government was devolved upon a five-man council and a caretaker government composed of representatives from five former political parties.

The temporary government, largely composed of civil servants, promised a return to full democratic liberties and the holding of elections in 1965. Strains between the government and the professional and trade unionist bodies that helped to bring it to power quickly became apparent; and the threat of purges within the civil service caused widespread malaise.

The caretaker government carried on, despite a five-day political vacuum in February, 1965, until June 10, 1965, when a newly-elected constituent assembly replaced it. Today, the Sudan is governed by a coalition of the two conservative parties—the right-wing Umma Party which commands authoritarian power in the countryside through the influence of the Mahdi and Ansari religious sects, and the center-right National Union Party (N.U.P.) which draws the bulk of its power from the urban centers and the Mirghanists or Khatmiya.

Sayed Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, of the majority Umma Party, was elected prime minister of the coalition government. The present cabinet is composed of seven members of the Umma Party, including the prime minister, six members of the N.U.P., two independents, and one Southerner, the last representing a region where voting in the general election did not take place. In July, the provisional constitution was amended to make the presidency of the Supreme Council of State a permanent post. Sayed Isma'il el-Azhari, leader of the N.U.P., was elected to this office.

⁵ J. S. R. Duncan, *The Sudan's Path to Independence* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1957), p. 197.

THE SAVANNA GRASS CURTAIN

Throughout this period, the presence of two contrasting culture groups, an Arabic-speaking Muslim North and a Christian or pagan South, has inhibited the establishment of a unified nation-state. It is often claimed that the problem is a legacy inherited from the British colonial policy of isolating the African South from the Muslim North.

Until 1947, when the policy was reversed, the aim was to develop in the South a series of self-contained tribal units based upon indigenous customs, tradition and beliefs. A similar policy was applied in the North. The policy was designed to bring to the two regions the advantages of Western technology and institutions with a view to ultimate self-rule and independence.

Many Southerners were disappointed to see the policy discarded. It was felt that

without protection, the Southerners will not be able to develop along indigenous lines, will be overwhelmed and swamped by the North and deteriorate into a servile community, hewing wood and drawing water. To pretend that there are not fundamental differences between them is like covering up a crack in the tree trunk with moss. Such a process, like an obscuring of the truth, is unsound.⁵

Resentment against the Arab Northerner reached its peak in 1955, four months before independence, when Southern army troops mutinied. The mutiny apparently sprang from long-standing grievances, misunderstanding and blind fear. The replacement of trusted British civil servants in the South by unsympathetic or incompetent Northerners aroused an increasing fear of Northern domination. To many Southerners, independence meant nothing more than exchanging one set of masters for another.

There is no legal political party within the Sudan which represents the interests of the South. Concern for the welfare of Southerners has been expressed primarily by two groups: the Southern Front, which operates within the country rather openly; and the Sudan African National Union (SANU) which was set up in exile in 1960 and operates from such far-ranging centers as Nairobi;

Kampala and London. The Southern Front, composed of young civil servants and intellectuals, acts as a bridge between the government and Southern Sudanese exiles. SANU, recently plagued by internal bickering, was organized by Joseph Oduho and William Deng. Its present leader is Aggrey Jaden with Father Saturnino Lohure, a Verona priest and former M.P., as patron.

All during the Abboud regime, there was little or no opportunity for Southern grievances to be aired. Finally in March, 1965, a round-table conference on the whole Southern question was held in Khartoum. The South was represented by the Southern Front and by SANU, with Aggrey Jaden acting as spokesman. William Deng, no longer acceptable to the majority of the SANU politicians, was invited to attend at the invitation of the Sudanese government.

The objective of the conference was to find some way of elevating the South's constitutional status so that it would no longer be the North's poor relation. The Southerners wished to control their own police, their own education and their own civil service. They also sought the establishment of a federal system of government in lieu of complete autonomy.

The outcome of the conference was to offer concessions providing greater autonomy to meet some Southern demands. However, *The Economist* (October 9, 1965) reported that the Southern rebellion continued strong; fighting had become a way of life. The Northerners remained adamant in refusing to grant federal status to the South.

Chronic unrest in the three Southern provinces has flared into more brazen attacks by the Anya Nya, a guerrilla organization recently strengthened by the acquisition of arms captured from Congolese rebels or of supplies destined for them. SANU and the Southern Front claim they have no control over Anya Nya, but offer no apologies for its actions.⁶

⁶ The East African countries, Ethiopia and the Congo have offered no political support to the Southerners other than providing for legitimate refugees. It appears that the desire to achieve some sort of "African Unity" is stronger than a desire to sympathize with their kith and kin.

A Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances which took place in the three Southern provinces in August, 1955, found evidence "that the real trouble in the South is political not religious; and neither the slave trade (antagonism towards Arabs) nor the differences in religion played a part in the disturbances." This same Commission listed several points which have to be borne in mind if the causes of Southern discontent are to be understood:

1. There is very little in common between the Northern and Southern Sudan. Racially, the North is Arab, the South is Negroid; religiously the North is Muslim, the South is pagan; linguistically, the North speaks Arabic, the South some 80 different languages. This is apart from the geographical, historical and cultural differences.
2. For historical reasons the Southerners regard the Northerners as their traditional enemies.
3. Until 1947, British administrative policy was to let the Southern Sudanese "progress on African and Negroid lines" (whatever that may mean) and, making use of the Closed Districts Order and the Permits to Trade Order, to prevent the Sudanese from knowing each other. The missionaries, responsible for most of the education of the Sudanese, supported the above policy.
4. For political, financial, geographical and economical reasons, the Northern Sudan progressed quickly in every field (local government, irrigation schemes, health, higher education, industrial development) while the Southern Sudan lagged far behind. This marked difference in development inevitably created a feeling in the

(Continued on page 178)

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As Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have developed separately after independence, this skilled observer points out that "the question of federation is in practice closed. . . ." He believes that . . . "the sights are now set, not on federation, but on a modus vivendi, short of a complete separation."

East Africa—Unity and Diversity

By LIONEL CLIFFE

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Writing about East Africa in 1966, one is very conscious of comparing three separate states, rather than discussing a unified, homogeneous area. In their stands on international issues and in their political systems, marked differences are developing among Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

The divergence seems the greater when one remembers that the three neighboring countries were formerly all British colonies, with a common market. They formed a customers union and ran many services, including railways and the post office, on a joint basis, and they also had a common currency. Less than three years ago the heads of government signed a declaration of intent to federate.

Nonetheless, today each has its own currency and central bank, and there are even restrictions on the import and export of some goods among themselves. In addition, there are tensions in the unique, federal University of East Africa. In December, 1965, different policies in African affairs became even more marked when Tanzania, unlike its two neighbors, broke off diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia.

Much of this divergence was an inevitable result of independence. The removal of the

common factor of British hegemony, and the consequent development of different policies and different national institutions, have set the three territories on different paths precisely because they are now deciding their own destinies. The inevitable logic of this was realized by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in a prophetic document he wrote in 1960¹ in which he argued the case for an East African federation *before* the territories became separately independent. He predicted that separate independence would "almost inevitably impose visas on us . . . [might] necessitate . . . [tariff] barriers . . . [would] almost inevitably lead to separate currencies and the establishment of National Central Banks."

The inevitable moving apart is seen most clearly today in terms of economics. The new currencies and central banks which were introduced were necessary if the states were to have any control of their own economies. It was unthinkable that the colonial relic—the East African Currency Board—could remain, and the alternative, a sort of federal reserve bank, was not popular in the absence of political federation. Tariffs were equally necessary as Tanzania and Uganda started to build up some industry. This inevitably had to be at the expense of Kenyan industry or, more accurately, at the expense of the East African industry that was centered in Kenya. So the

¹ J. K. Nyerere, "East African Federation Freedom and Unity," a paper circulated for discussion to all East African nationalist leaders.

economic barriers were built up; and along with them psychological barriers, as the businessman wanting to import or export goods or the visitor on a trip faced regulations that strengthened his belief that he was dealing with a foreign country.

It is perhaps necessary to restore a balanced view by pointing out that railways, posts and other services are still run in common by the three states. There is still considerable interchange of goods despite restrictions. There has been some effort to apportion new, large-scale industries on an East African basis.

However, the trend is clearly in the opposite direction. And the upshot of these developments is that the question of federation is in practice closed, although as recently as August, 1965, President Nyerere, the great protagonist of federation, again raised the subject publicly. He did nevertheless conclude that "unity cannot be achieved as easily as we once hoped and expected."²

Nyerere also drew attention to the fact that there is "such economic integration between our sovereign states that frictions are inevitable in the absence of efficient decision-making machinery." A commission has now been set up by the three governments to look into this problem and to evaluate the whole future of the East African common market and common services. In other words, the sights are now set, not on federation, but on a *modus vivendi*, short of a complete separation.

PAN-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

The differing roles that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are playing in Pan-African affairs are also in part natural, in the sense that their policies are to some extent determined by their geographical positions. From East Africa, Tanzania looks south to the areas where the liberation struggle has yet to be fought. Kenya looks to her northern neighbors, Somalia and Ethiopia, and to the border dispute in which these three countries are involved.

² Speech by J. K. Nyerere, at the opening of the eleventh session of the East African Central Legislative Assembly (the embryonic federal legislature which legislates for the remaining common services) in Dar es Salaam, August 11, 1965.

Uganda, like Tanzania, has received many refugees from conflicts beyond her borders; however, these are not victims of white domination but of tribal, ethnic and political conflicts in the neighboring states of Sudan to the north and the Congo (Leopoldville), Rwanda and Burundi to the West. Each state has thus a different perspective on African affairs.

The politically-conscious populations of all three countries have the same sense of common cause with fellow-Africans in the white-dominated areas of Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa that American Negroes in the North feel with those in the South. If this feeling is more evident in Dar es Salaam, this is partly due to Tanzania's proximity to the struggle and to the presence in Tanzania of refugees and freedom-fighters.

Tanzania's geographical position as the site of the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee and her hosting of the Mozambique Liberation Front make her the forward base in the fight for independence in the South. (This is true despite Zambia's independence, for Tanzania is not so vulnerable as Zambia to retaliatory measures.) On the other hand, passions in Uganda were probably more aroused over the Congo issue than over Rhodesia.

In addition, refugees pose serious internal problems for both Tanzania and Uganda. The different refugee groups present a large security problem for Tanzania, and subject her to considerable outside diplomatic pressure. But Tanzania has a way out of her refugee-inspired problems—the return of the refugees as freedom fighters to liberate their countries. Indeed, the suspicion grows that some members of these refugee groups are reluctant to leave Dar es Salaam (the haven of peace), so if Tanzania is to be rid of the refugee problem she must put fire into the bellies of some of the more ineffectual groups.

During the height of the independence crisis in Rhodesia, Nyerere alternately condemned Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and berated some of the nationalists who were still enjoying life in Dar es Salaam's better hotels. However, over and above all

these considerations of self-interest, there is a large element of idealism behind Tanzania's courage in taking the lead on the issue of Rhodesia.

SECURITY AND STABILITY

In addition to their interest in Pan-Africanism, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, like most new nations, are preoccupied with the problem of stability and with a fear of neocolonialism. Their preoccupation stems partly from their natural weakness as new, underdeveloped nations—in terms of the forces at their command, the small size of their elite groups, their still youthful national loyalties, the unrealizable aspirations of their leaders, and their unemployed. While none of the East African territories is in imminent danger of collapse—of becoming another Congo—each is affected to some degree by these considerations.

On the other hand, these East African states have regained some of the self-confidence they lost at the time of the Army mutinies in each of their states in 1964. Tanzania, which suffered most, has completely rebuilt its armed forces with young men drawn from the Youth League of TANU (the Tanganyika African National Union), having learned that a handful of disgruntled, armed men can jeopardize the whole state. Today, Tanzania's regime is one of the most stable in Africa, despite its limited economic and military resources, and the scarcity of skilled personnel.

Kenya and Uganda have relatively greater resources, but face a wider range of problems. In Kenya, the problem posed by the unemployed who have left school is far more acute than it is in the two neighboring countries. Of those who left primary school in Kenya at the end of 1965, probably more than three-fourths have neither jobs nor opportunity for further education. Some of these young men

and women are absorbed temporarily in the National Youth Service, where public works and learning a trade are emphasized. In addition to this footloose army of unemployed youth, Central Kenya has many landless—a result of the consolidation of small fragmented plots in the area. To make matters worse, many of those who have not benefitted from consolidation were in detention at the time—the martyrs of the independence struggle.

TRIBALISM AND POLITICS

In both Kenya and Uganda, ethnic divisions persist, creating rivalries between individuals and between different areas, and delaying the creation of a sense of national unity. In the immediate postindependence period, Kenya's political parties were divided between the largest tribes, who supported Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya African National Union (KANU), and the smaller tribes, apprehensive about their future and their land, who were united in the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Since the end of 1964, when Ronald Ngala and other leaders of KADU voluntarily created a one-party state by coming over to KANU, they have become accepted and influential leaders in the single party. At the same time, the battle for power between the larger tribes, mainly Kikuyu and Luo, even for junior administrative posts, has become more marked. In fact, this tribal division gives an added dimension to the struggle between Vice-President Oginga Odinga, a Luo, and some of his less radical opponents.

In Uganda the chief problem in building national unity focuses on the Baganda,³ who have a special, privileged position in the political and economic life of the country, a position that is enshrined in the constitution. Buganda is, in fact, a quasi-federal state within Uganda. There are also three other kingdoms and another district, all of which share a lesser degree of autonomy; the remaining districts have merely local government institutions. The inward-looking, conservative Baganda have great pride in and loyalty to their highly developed traditional system, and this in turn is epitomized by the

³ To clear up the complications of language: Uganda is the name of the state; Buganda the name of the central Kingdom ruled over by a traditional ruler, the Kabaka. (At the present time the man who is Kabaka of Buganda also holds the position of President of Uganda.) The people of Buganda are called Baganda, and they speak Luganda.

Kabaka. Their attitudes differ widely from those of the peoples of the less developed Nilotic tribes of the North with their segmented and egalitarian social systems, who were in fact the founders of the ruling U.P.C. (Uganda Peoples' Congress).

A modus vivendi between the Baganda and other Ugandans has not yet been established and at the time of this writing the government is taking up the cudgels, threatening to pass legislation to curb the activities of the Kabaka Yekka.⁴ There is nevertheless a genuine attempt being made in Uganda to build up tribal and national loyalties side by side.

This section on security and stability should not conclude without pointing out to a distant and alien audience that there are at present no actual disturbances. One can travel throughout East Africa with far less fear of physical danger than when entering New York's Central Park at night. The various factors outlined here are, thankfully, as yet only potential threats to security.

These same factors—the resources available, the size of the administrative and political elite, the extent of feelings of national loyalty, and the aspirations of the people—also in a general sense determine the political system. The political system, in turn, can affect each of them. One of the features of African political systems which has aroused much interest is the phenomenon of the one-party regime. If we consider this aspect in East Africa, we are struck once again by the great divergence of the three patterns in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.

UGANDAN POLITICS

Uganda is the only one of the three countries which still has more than one party, and it is interesting to study its failure to establish a one-party system. In fact, the stated intention of the U.P.C. government, as long ago as early 1964, was to create a one-party state, and most observers would have thought the matter settled when leaders of the other parties joined the U.P.C. Just before and

after independence, the Kabaka Yekka took part in a coalition government, a marriage of convenience which enabled the U.P.C. to oust the rival Democratic Party (D.P.) from office in 1961. When U.P.C. parliamentary strength grew as a result of defections from D.P., the alliance with K.Y. (which was becoming increasingly restrictive) was no longer necessary. The break was finally made in June, 1964.

However, the break with Buganda was not complete, because Prime Minister Milton Obote had maneuvered the Kabaka into the position of president of the new Republic of Uganda. The Kabaka thus found himself in a position where his own loyalties were divided once Kabaka Yekka stood in opposition to the regime, of which he was the titular head. When, in mid-1965, some K.Y. members of parliament and other leaders followed the D.P. leaders across the floor against the U.P.C., one thought the complete break was only a matter of time. However in the last few months, both the Kabaka Yekka (whose more conservative leaders stayed faithful), and the D.P. have gained strength, the K.Y., surprisingly, even getting some support outside Buganda.

The task of opposition leaders has been made easier by the splits within the U.P.C. In addition to the exclusion from power of the radical John Kakonge, other factors were perhaps the suggested rivalry between the Bantu and the Nilotic tribes (most of whom support U.P.C.), and intertwined are charges and countercharges of "Communist" and "Imperialist stooge." Thus Uganda for the moment has a competitive system, although the future of Ugandan politics should be clearer after elections scheduled for early 1967.

KENYAN POLITICS

Kenya, on the other hand, completed the establishment of a voluntary one-party situation through the voluntary transfer of allegiance from KADU to KANU. However, President Jomo Kenyatta made it clear to the nation in his December, 1965, Independence Day address that there were no plans

⁴ Kabaka Yekka (K.Y.), is the party of Buganda. The words mean "Kabaka Alone."

to enact a one-party constitution; as was done in Tanzania a year ago. So, although Kenya and Tanzania both have one-party systems, the constitutional arrangements in Kenya more closely resemble those in Uganda. The same is true of the general plurality of the system in practice. The pattern of ethnic and ideological rivalries and the demands of well-organized interest groups, such as the labor unions (often themselves divided), mean that the single-party system in Kenya is just a rubric for a complex set of political forces.

TANZANIAN POLITICS

In Tanzania, the single party has a totally different role. TANU—the Tanganyika African National Union—is the regime and is becoming increasingly the nation, which has a single party because there was never any effective alternative. TANU was the national liberation movement which expressed the aspirations of the whole nation for independence from colonial rule. When this task had been achieved, and TANU took over from the colonial government, it was not immediately clear what its new role was; during this time TANU drifted apart somewhat from the people. This trend has now been reversed.

The party has defined its role, and the integration of the masses into the single party regime is being effected. Tanzania is very fortunate in having a well organized mass party organization, with an absence of significant tribal, religious or personality divisions. The party can thus be used to mobilize the whole people—particularly in the rural areas—for the task of development. It becomes in essence the implementation mechanism for the Five Year Plan; whereas in Kenya and Uganda the different structure of the ruling parties precludes this. A mass party like TANU aiming at linking the people effectively into the process of change is a feature of a number of African systems.

However, one new development in the Tanzania system in 1965 deserves some attention. This is the new one-party constitutional framework replacing the set of institutions on

the Westminster pattern inherited by all the East African countries. Previous elections in Tanzania involved official TANU nominees versus some “also-rans” and in a majority of cases the TANU candidates were returned unopposed. In September, 1965, an election was held under the new system which was in a sense a primary within the single party. The party selected *two* candidates in each constituency and let them contest each seat. TANU actually ran the campaign—public meetings and all—for both candidates. Some of the meetings were very exciting, with confrontation a feature of every one of them.

The results of this highly original election were a few upsets of members of the government who had not mended their fences, and a new and very lively parliament, for the first time really representative of the people. The elections also had a great impact on the ordinary people who felt drawn into the political system in a real way, perhaps for the first time. The effect has been to give the people, their new representatives, and the regime a greater feeling of self-confidence and a feeling of pride in their unique, democratic one-party system.

We have, therefore, a curious situation: Tanzania has democratized its regime by institutionalizing a one-party system. Indeed, partly through its new constitution, it has done more than its East African neighbors, Kenya and Uganda, to ensure the active participation of the people in the political process. But as the latter countries grapple with their diffuse societies, other new political concepts may evolve.

NONALIGNMENT

In the present polarized international environment, many want to know whether a nation is pro-East or pro-West. With regard to East Africa, the simple answer, of course, is neither. Policies in East Africa are usually conceived in terms of East African interests, however they look from outside. But here again we must recognize differences. Tanzania apparently occupies a position to the left of her neighbors. This is partly a result of shifts to the right by both Kenya and

Uganda due to Communist "scares" in 1965. There is talk of subversion and threats to security—again with reference to Communist threats—in Kenya and, to a lesser extent, in Uganda. At the same time, the absence of such public anxiety in Tanzania plus the visits of some leaders to Moscow, and even to Peking, sharpen the apparent differences.

The differing East African attitudes towards the cold war participants are dictated by a number of different factors of which ideological commitment is of very slight importance. The less militant stands that Kenya and Uganda have taken on the liberation struggle in southern Africa and some of the reasons behind them have been mentioned.

There are other internal political and economic circumstances affecting foreign policy. For instance, the Communist scares in Kenya and Uganda early in 1965 were directed against factions in the ruling political parties, personified by Vice-President Oginga Odinga of Kenya, and John Kakonge, until then Secretary-General of the Uganda Peoples' Congress (U.P.C.).

Whether these leaders, or anyone in any of these groups, is a thorough-going Communist—in the sense of understanding and accepting Marxism-Leninism—is very problematic. It is very hard to know whether there was anything behind these scares at all. However, it is true that there are those in the two countries who advocate more radical, economic and social policies, who make more noise about "imperialism," and who do not regard the Eastern bloc as political bogeymen.

Even in Tanzania, some of the Zanzibar ministers might be so characterized, but they do not represent a faction, firstly because the regime is itself more radical, and secondly, because there are no other divisions within the ruling party, TANU, on which differences over policy or ideology can feed. The same is not true of Uganda and Kenya. Especially in the latter, long-standing tribal and personality conflicts play up differing policy stands, as does the fact that the different groups have lived on funds from West and East.

In Kenya also, the prevalent anti-Communist attitude may be ascribed to economic

factors. Kenya has already a comparatively well-developed business sector, mainly British. Prosperity therefore depends on retaining the confidence of the existing business community much more than it does in Tanzania, where there is less dependence on private enterprise, now or in the future, for Tanzanians are starting at the foot of the ladder.

The converse of this is that Tanzania, which has always been less able to attract private investment than Kenya, and less fortunate in British assistance than Kenya or Uganda, has had to turn to other sources for development investment. This is reinforced by the fact that she has established the most detailed and ambitious of the Five Year Plans and has at the same time the least potential for internal saving. Tanzania has therefore sought and received aid from the East to a greater extent than Kenya and Uganda. Indeed, China is the biggest single contributor to Tanzania's Five Year Plan—with an almost \$42 million loan on very good terms—as yet with no visible strings attached. This has happened at a time when West German aid has been withdrawn, a cooling-off period in United States aid has taken place and there may have to be some curtailment in future aid from Britain.

Summarizing their foreign policies, it is clear that the differing problems faced by the three East African states involve them in different sets of pressures from the outside world, especially from the West, and invoke different reactions. Nonetheless, all three states are allegedly nonaligned, and insofar as the term "nonaligned" refers to various possible neutral positions, this is an accurate term.

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In a discussion of economic growth and political development in West Africa, this author concludes that "nation-building is a long-term project. . . ." In 1966, as the author sees it, "Further gravitation of power into military hands may be hard to avoid. . . ."

Shifting Authority in West Africa

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DURING 1965, the 14 independent states of West Africa attempted to promote national unity and economic development by a variety of methods. These attempts were complicated by the continued strength of ethnic particularism, by often unfavorable prices for agricultural products, and by the growing possibility of military intervention. The euphoria of the immediate post-independence period has passed for most of the countries (nine formerly under French administration or trusteeship, four once under British rule, and the American-influenced state of Liberia). The tasks of governance have proven substantially different from the creation of anticolonial movements.

A combined emphasis upon political authority and economic austerity perhaps best summarizes trends in 1965. Economic austerity forced the reexamination of many development schemes. Although 1965 witnessed a number of fundamental changes, the economic outlook for most West African states was far from optimistic.

The political outlook was clouded by military coups in Dahomey and Upper Volta, and by the installation of a military regime in Nigera after a protracted period of very high tension.

The movement toward single-party systems continued, justified by heads of state as best promoting the creation of "nations" from

collections of diverse groups. The decline of popular enthusiasm and the persistence of tribalism have paved the way for one-party rule—reinforced in many states during the past year by uncontested elections.

Elections were held in seven West African countries during 1965. In all but one, the results were foregone conclusions. Voters walked to the polls not to choose between competing parties, but to manifest their support for unopposed regimes. In the Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta—each formerly a French colony—the parties in power received all but a handful of the votes cast. The *Parti du Peuple Mauritanien* received 95 per cent of the votes in the May election for the legislative assembly; five per cent abstained. In Togo, the coalition *Union Nationale Togolaise* won over 99 per cent of the ballots in district and municipal council elections in June.

The *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* won all 85 seats in the National Assembly and 140 seats in local councils, without opposition, in the month of November; President Félix Houphouët-Boigny was reelected with only 332 voters (of a total turn-out of 1,867,937) voting against him. In the Ivory Coast's northern neighbor, Upper Volta, President Maurice Yameogo was returned in October with 99.97 per cent of the votes; the following month, despite

the abstention of more than a third of the electorate in the capital city of Ouagadougou, 2,132,418 of the 2,188,241 registered voters supported the single list. In the huge, land-locked state of Niger, the *Parti Progressiste Nigérien* received over 99 per cent of the votes in the October election for the National Assembly.

The logical extension of the single-party trend was realized in Ghana. As the result of a referendum early in 1964, the constitution had been amended to permit only the Convention People's Party of President Kwame Nkrumah to nominate candidates for election. Instead of calling voters to the polls in June to select members of the enlarged National Assembly, the 198 C.P.P. nominees were simply declared elected because no opposing candidates had filed papers.

NIGERIAN COMPETITION

Certainly the most publicized election occurred in Nigeria, where party strife led to army intervention in January, 1966. Twelve months before, the election for the federal House of Representatives, held on December 30, 1964, was boycotted by the United Progressive Grand Alliance, formed a few months earlier by parties tending toward the left of Nigeria's political spectrum. The U.P.G.A. cried "Foul" to the tactics allegedly employed by supporters of the more conservative, rival Nigerian National Alliance, which won over half the seats in the House.

After four days of acute tension, President Nnamdi Azikiwe (whose former party was a member of U.P.G.A.) and federal Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (a leading official of the N.N.A.) compromised: balloting was rescheduled in constituencies where the boycott had been almost completely effective. It was also agreed that elections would be held in the Western Region, ruled by a member party of the N.N.A. Sir Abubakar subsequently formed an 80-member cabinet, drawn from all but one of the major Nigerian parties.

The Western Regional contest was of fundamental importance, since it pitted the

U.P.G.A. and N.N.A. against each other in an area of high tension. Until May, 1962, the Action Group (a member of U.P.G.A.) had formed the regional government. A split in the party, however, led the federal government to proclaim a state of emergency in the West and suspend the region's parliament. Five months later, the leader of the Action Group was arrested and charged with conspiring to overthrow the federal government by violent means. He was subsequently sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, and clemency was a main plank in the Action Group platform. Political control of the region passed to Chief Samuel L. Akintola, a former Action Group member, who organized his own party (the United Peoples Party, later called the Nigerian National Democratic Party) allied with the N.N.A.

Action Group supporters were unshakable in their belief that, given a free election, their party would return triumphantly to power. Partisans of Chief Akintola, on the other hand, sensed that conditions in the Western Region favored their tenure in office—after all, no government in West Africa has yet been voted out of office. Both sides expected victory in the October, 1965, balloting, but both parties took precautions in mobilizing voters, perhaps even extra ballot papers. The situation, in short, was explosive. As a correspondent of the weekly magazine *West Africa* noted,

The election has been awaited with a patience that has bottled up feeling to a dangerous extent, and has brought about a frenzied concern in the Action Group in particular that they might be cheated of what they considered their due.¹

Both the N.N.D.P. and the Action Group claimed victory. That the returns were altered in favor of the N.N.D.P. seems clear: it won 70 of the 94 seats, a figure well above most predictions. The acting leader of the Action Group claimed, on the other hand, that his party won a minimum of 65 seats. He declared himself ready to form a government for the Western Region, and was arrested and charged with attempting to act as premier of the Region without lawful au-

¹ *West Africa*, Oct. 16, 1965, p. 1151.

thority. Riots, protest marches, intimidation and murders shattered the post-election period, fanning the discontent that exploded in January, 1966, with the military assumption of power.

The conduct of the election raised many serious doubts whether party competitiveness might not exacerbate an already tense situation. To quote one observer, "I had an uneasy and perhaps entirely unwarranted premonition that there . . . was being enacted the funeral rites of the Westminster model as a practical proposition in African politics."² At least 160 persons died (including 64 killed by police gunfire) in violence reportedly encouraged by Action Group supporters to buttress their demand for new elections.

MILITARY COUP

It was the continuing unrest in the Western Region that resulted in the proclamation of army rule by Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. Early in the morning of January 15, 1966, junior officers (almost all Ibos from the Eastern Region) lashed out at the politicians who, in the officers' view, seemed bent on enriching themselves and their regions, not on settling pressing problems of national unity. The Prime Ministers of the North and the West, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola, were assassinated; the federal minister of finance was reportedly slain and the federal prime minister was kidnapped and later found dead.

Aguiyi-Ironsi suspended the constitution, abolished the offices of the president and prime minister, dismissed all civilian ministers and appointed military governors for the four regions. "Our primary purpose," he stated, "is to restore law and order." He also commented that "the people of Nigeria wanted a military government and wanted the army to take over to avoid further bloodshed." General Aguiyi-Ironsi pledged to step down from power following the framing of a new constitution—but when a constitutional conference would be convened was uncertain as this article went to press.

The tiny country of Dahomey experienced two military coups in December. General Christophe Soglo, commander of the 800-man army, resolved a political impasse in early December between President Sourou Migan Apithy and Prime Minister Justin Ahomadegbe by dismissing both men and naming the president of the national assembly, Tairou Congacou, head of a provisional administration. Near the end of the month, Soglo intervened once again, dissolving all political parties and taking personal control of the state.

A similar sequence of events culminating in a military take-over occurred in Upper Volta early in 1966. Tensions ran high in the capital, Ouagadougou, following a government-ordered 20 per cent salary cut. A state of emergency was proclaimed on January 2, following discovery of an alleged plot. According to Yameogo, Joseph Ouedraogo (former president of the national assembly and ex-mayor of Ouagadougou) had intended to seize power. Thousands of demonstrators threatened to storm the presidential mansion the following day; the police were forced to use tear gas.

On January 4, the army chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Sangoule Lamizana, seized power. Yameogo was quoted as welcoming the coup, saying, "Contrary to what one would think, my ministers and I are the first to rejoice at the way things were settled. I am happy that the chief of staff of the army, surrounded by his officers, has been able in perfect harmony with me, to act in such a way that the country can go forward."

The stability of Guinea was also affected by a purported plot. According to an official statement in November, France and members of the Council of the Entente (Ivory Coast, Niger, and Upper Volta) planned to assassinate President Sekou Touré. The French ambassador to Guinea was expelled, the cabinet was reshuffled, and several ministers were arrested. These moves, in combination with Touré's criticism of O.C.A.M., seemed to signal increasingly cool relations between Guinea and other French-speaking African states.

The military seizures of power in Nigeria,

² *West Africa*, Oct. 16, 1965, p. 1150.

Dahomey and Upper Volta, and the unrest in Guinea, illustrate that peaceful procedures for the transfer of political power have yet to gain full acceptance. In both Nigeria and Dahomey, unbridled party conflict exacerbated regional and ethnic tensions, in effect inviting the army commanders to dissolve or drastically modify elective institutions.

Rather than a one-party state, or a multi-party state, a third possibility is thus a no-party state, in which authority is vested in the military. Army regimes may be able to transcend conflicts based on personality and region, thereby providing the foundation of national unity that, over a protracted period, might result in more orderly methods of holding or transferring power. Until this fundamental problem of political authority is solved, however, the politics of West African states will remain volatile and subject to violent alterations. It is easy to seize power, difficult to surrender it—and perhaps most difficult to use it effectively.

ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES

The road to economic development in West Africa was paved with good intentions but barricaded by unavoidable obstacles. For many West African states, the economic results of 1965 were disappointing. On the other hand, the inauguration of several industrial enterprises brought cautious optimism in some states, particularly Nigeria.

Four factors led to pessimism. The gap between developed, industrialized countries north of the Tropic of Cancer and the underdeveloped, agricultural states of West Africa widened in several respects.³ While the costs of many industrial items rose, the prices for many primary products declined. Cocoa, the major export of Ghana and a leading earner of foreign exchange for the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Togo, fell to its lowest price in 20 years. At the height of scarcity during the Korean War, a ton of cocoa brought over \$1,250 on the world market; in September,

1965, a ton brought about \$260, far below the expectations of West African governments.

The crisis resulted largely from record production or, in terms kinder to West African states, the crisis was caused by failure of consumption in developed countries to keep pace with increased productivity. Ghana alone produced more than twice as much in 1965 as a decade earlier—590,000 tons as compared with approximately 250,000 tons in the mid-1950's; world consumption in 1965 was estimated at 1.3 million tons, production at 1.5 million tons.

External assistance to West African countries in 1965 did not noticeably diminish the gap. The perilous position of sterling forced the British government to curtail aid and to impose restrictions on overseas investment. The French government substantially completed its withdrawal of troops from West Africa, thereby indirectly trimming state revenues in Senegal and Niger as much as 10 per cent. Although France continued to provide relatively more financial assistance than other developed states (about two per cent of the gross national product, compared with one-half of one per cent for the U. S.), the available funds were often absorbed by administrative expenses.

The American contribution remained limited, the United States preferring to encourage its European allies to carry the main burden. In fiscal 1964, for example, the United States (through the Agency for International Development) authorized \$80 million in loans to West African states and expended \$46.4 million. The subsequent review of aid by the Johnson administration also affected the funds available for West Africa.

In November, for example, the United States rejected Ghana's request for \$129 million in surplus food, partly to protest President Kwame Nkrumah's condemnation of American policy in his recent book, *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism*. In terms of technical personnel, the American contribution fell far below that of the British and French.

³ For a detailed study of the problems of lessening the gap, see George D. Woods, "The Development Decade in the Balance," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1966, pp. 206-215.

A third factor in the economic picture, directly related to falling prices for primary products and limited external aid, was the inadequacy of domestic resources to finance development. Insistent demands by trade unionists and civil servants brought higher wages—but correspondingly diminished the funds available for investment. “Austerity” remained a prominent slogan. To slash administrative expenses, however, seemed to a number of West African leaders a potential hazard leading to disaffection among government employees.

Ghana dramatically showed during 1965 the precarious nature of West African economies. The government continued to invest substantial funds in industrial projects, which entailed deficit financing, depletion of foreign exchange reserves and imposition of strict import controls. The *Economic Survey* published in Accra pointed out that the national debt soared from \$65 million in 1959 to nearly \$980 million in 1964; export earnings had remained nearly constant in the period, while government expenditures had risen more than 60 per cent. The parlous condition of Ghana’s finances forced the government to request International Monetary Fund assistance. How Ghana could solve her economic difficulties, short of a drastic change in the world cocoa price and exceptionally stringent economies, was unclear at the end of the year.

The final gloomy aspect of the economic picture was the relative inefficiency of many industries. The small size of markets placed inherent limits on economies of scale. Without widespread regional cooperation, the prospects for industrial growth are not encouraging. A country like Gambia (population 315,000) cannot realistically hope to attain industrialization; yet all West African leaders dream of establishing factories. This desire leads to tariff protection for local plants and to a gradual reduction of trading links with adjacent states. As *The Economist* has pointed out in regard to the financial prospects for Dahomey, “Dahomey’s smallness

and poverty, and a society which has virtually no middle class between the Camembert-eating *élite* and fufu-eating populace, puts any would-be planner into a strait-jacket.”⁴

ENCOURAGING PROSPECTS

In many other respects, however, 1965 witnessed encouraging economic progress in West Africa. The dam on the Volta River—keystone to Ghana’s industrial development—started to generate electricity late in the year. By 1967, the aluminum smelter at the port of Tema will be in full operation. President Sekou Touré of Guinea, following a trip to the Soviet Union, announced that a dam and aluminum smelter (possibly costing as much as \$280 million) would be constructed on the Konkouré River. When the plant goes into full production, an annual output of 150,000 tons of aluminum is envisaged. A British-constructed textile mill has just started production in Guinea, while Pan-American World Airways has agreed to furnish technical assistance to Air Guinea.

Perhaps the most promising economic news came from Nigeria, where the opening of a refinery at Port Harcourt and the discovery of new offshore oil fields boosted hopes for substantial production increases. According to one estimate, Nigeria might, by 1970, produce 50 million tons of petroleum annually, sufficient to meet all domestic needs and to provide \$700 million in foreign exchange—more than the current value of *all* Nigerian exports. The Nigerian government signed an \$84 million agreement with an American and German consortium for an iron and steel industry, the first such mill in tropical Africa; a capacity of between 125,000 and 250,000 tons per year is now in the planning stage.

An \$80 million iron ore mine opened in Liberia, while the production of rutile in Sierra Leone will commence in 1966. The inauguration of new harbor facilities at Lomé (Togo) and Cotonou (Dahomey) eased transportation difficulties that had hindered development, while the Asaba-Onitsha bridge in Nigeria linked the East and Midwest Regions for the first time.

⁴ *The Economist* (London), June 12, 1965.

INTERSTATE RELATIONS

The quest for unity remains one of the most nettlesome problems confronting West African states. Is unity—much-discussed, but little-implemented—best achieved at the level of the entire African continent, within a geographic region, on the basis of similar colonial experiences, or on the foundation of similar political ideologies and outlooks? The conflict among these approaches has plagued West Africa since 1960, and 1965 was no exception.

During 1965, two important conferences of African heads of state were held in West Africa. The presidents of 13 French-speaking countries met at Nouakchott, Mauritania, in February to form the *Organisation Communauté Africaine et Malgache* (O.C.A.M.). Eight months later, representatives of 28 African states assembled in Accra, Ghana, for the third annual meeting of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). The contrasts between the two organizations epitomize one aspect of African interstate relations: the lack of agreement on the most suitable method of attaining unity.

O.C.A.M. is in most respects a reembodyment of the *Union Africaine et Malgache*, formed in 1961 and disbanded in 1964. All but one of its 14 members had been French colonies which had, following independence, remained within the franc zone. Several criticisms were leveled against the U.A.M., owing to the close ties many of its members retained with France; it was argued that the U.A.M.'s basis of organization—a similar colonial heritage and a relatively moderate approach in world politics—militated against the continent-wide scope of the O.A.U. Pressure from O.A.U. member states brought about the dissolution of the U.A.M., but many French-speaking leaders (in particular Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast) became impatient with the O.A.U.'s apparent inability to solve the Congolese crisis.

The establishment of O.C.A.M. was also a reaction to policies followed by Ghana, which allegedly "harbor[ed] agents of sub-

version and organize[d] training camps. . . ."⁵ The criticisms of Ghana were repeated at a special O.C.A.M. meeting held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, late in May. The nine states represented (Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta) announced that they would boycott the forthcoming O.A.U. meeting in Accra.

THE BOYCOTT

The announcement of boycott plans caused a great deal of concern in West Africa. The boycott, if carried out, seemed likely to reopen the ideological quarrels between "reformist" and "revolutionary" groups of states—quarrels temporarily pushed into the background by the formation of the O.A.U. in 1963. The government of Nigeria took immediate steps, and convened an extraordinary meeting of the O.A.U. council of ministers in June. A compromise resolution called upon O.A.U. members to attend the Accra meeting. The government of Ghana stated publicly that it would expel "undesirable refugees."

The O.C.A.M. states declared themselves dissatisfied with the sincerity of Ghanaian professions, however, and all the countries represented at the Abidjan meeting (with the exception of Senegal) stayed away from the O.A.U. conference. Although the Rhodesian crisis overshadowed the effects of the O.C.A.M. boycott, there was little doubt that the O.A.U. had suffered a grave setback. It was equally clear that African states

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⁵ According to a final communiqué of the O.C.A.M., Feb. 12, 1965.

Discussing the background of the Tshombe-Kasavubu rivalry and the subsequent seizure of power by the military, this historian concludes that "it will be a miracle if the Congo at long last finds the stability it sorely needs."

Political Rivalry in the Congo

By HARRY R. RUDIN

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THE CONGO has enjoyed neither peace nor order since it became independent in 1960. The United Nations defeat in 1963 of Moïse Tshombe's secessionist movement in Katanga led people to believe that peace might follow. There were a few months of relative peace after Tshombe's removal from the Congo, but that period ended with the outbreak of rebellion early in 1964. The uprising spread rapidly in the central and eastern regions of the vast state.

President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Cyrille Adoula were unable to cope with this insurgency, one reason being their intense preoccupation with activities to keep themselves in power. In exile in distant Madrid, Tshombe kept an eye on the troubled situation in the Congo, where he had agents working for him. He was waiting for the opportunity to return to power.

As the situation worsened, Kasavubu and Adoula, much against their feelings, decided to recall Tshombe in July, 1964. It was not out of affection for Kasavubu that Tshombe consented to return. To friends urging an earlier return he had said that cooperation with President Kasavubu was impossible. The fiery Katangan returned, however, and, to the dismay of Adoula, was appointed provisional premier with the task of getting the country to function under the new 1964 constitution. He would also have to suppress the growing rebellion, to arrange for parliamentary elections and accomplish what he

could for the country's suffering economy. President Kasavubu kept a watchful eye on Tshombe while an embittered Adoula went off in a huff into self-imposed exile in Europe.

Aided by Belgium and the United States as well as by white mercenaries hired in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Europe, Tshombe set about the task of subduing the rebellion. The rebels were being supported by arms and other aid from Communist China, the Soviet Union, Algeria, the United Arab Republic, the former French Congo and other African nations to whom Tshombe appeared as an agent of white imperialists.

In November, 1964, Tshombe succeeded in capturing Stanleyville, which had become the capital of the rebel republic. The circumstances of that victory aroused increased hostility in the Organization of African Unity, which sought to effect a reconciliation of the rebels with the Congolese government (a policy that Adoula was advocating from his European exile). These efforts at reconciliation failed. By March, 1965, the rebels were driven back into the northeastern corner of the Congo; they lost in Uganda and in the Sudan the supply routes by which Soviet and Chinese arms had reached them. For a time it appeared as though the Congo would become involved in war with Uganda over this aid.

The rebel leaders, Christopher Gbenye and Gaston Soumialot, fled to Cairo; they tried to organize a rebel regime in exile by creating

the Supreme Council of the Revolution as successor to the defeated republic. Gbenye became prime minister and Soumialot president of this 20-member council. Cooperation between the leaders proved to be an impossibility, another illustration of an African axiom that politicians cannot cooperate successfully. In its new form the rebel government never amounted to anything.

On April 29, 1965, Tshombe felt so confident that he formally announced the end of the rebellion. He had accomplished what Kasavubu and Adoula had been unable to do. His popularity in the Congo grew enormously. The defeat of the rebels was a great military achievement (however unpopular with many African governments because of the employment of white Rhodesians and South Africans in the undertaking). As a result, some of the African states began to change their minds. OCAM, the organization of Malagasy and former French-speaking colonies in Africa, admitted Tshombe to membership, much to the displeasure of Kasavubu.

Despite the formal proclamation of victory over the rebels, the rebellion cannot be regarded as definitively ended. Armed gangs continue to roam the countryside in the northeastern Congo. The government has had to authorize European heads of plantations and mines to arm themselves against the depredations of these irregulars. By the end of 1965, they still had to be dealt with if peace and order, necessary for economic growth, were ever to be established.

THE ECONOMIC PICTURE

Tshombe was also able to record successes in other fields. In February he made a most important economic agreement with Belgium's foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak. This accord transferred to the Congo, in keeping

with promises made in 1960, the portfolio of securities held by the former Belgian colonial administration. These securities had a value of \$300 million. Arrangements were made for the settlement of the Congo's external debt, of which Belgium assumed half. Provision was made for four Congolese to sit as directors on the board of the *Union Minière du Haut Katanga*, a mining corporation in which the interests of the Congo referred to this agreement as a "historic: 24.5 per cent of the voting rights.¹ On his return to the Congo from Brussels, Tshombe referred to this agreement as a "historic victory."

The land had suffered much from the rebellion, from the devastation of rebel raids² and fighting as well as from the huge outlay of funds to combat the insurgents. The drain on the country's reserves had been great, with the result that there was serious talk of devaluing the franc again, as in November, 1963. There was a drop in the production of food as well as a large drop in the export of such products as palm oil, coffee, cotton, and rubber from the rebellious areas that produced them. Tshombe sought foreign aid and succeeded in getting it in various forms and amounts from France, Spain, West Germany, Belgium, and the United States.

Even today, river transportation with Stanleyville has yet to become a reality. The restoration of the country's economy will be a major problem for the new government coming into power, a problem that cannot have any possible solution without considerable foreign aid.

ELECTIONS

There had been no parliament since September, 1963, when Kasavubu sent the deputies home because of their inability to reach agreement on a new constitution. It was Tshombe's responsibility to hold elections for a national assembly under the 1964 constitution. For a number of reasons those elections had to be postponed from February to March 18–April 30, 1965.

It was claimed that 243 parties existed in the country, reminiscent of a similarly chaotic

¹ Because Katanga was removed from the area of rebellion, copper production and the profits of *Union Minière* increased, although not to pre-independence levels.

² For reasons of their own the rebels made it a policy to kill off natives who had acquired a bit of education and had worked for the administration, to say nothing about the hundreds of massacred whites, whether officials of the government, planters, traders, miners, or Christian missionaries.

tic political situation in the spring of 1960, at the time of the territory's first parliamentary elections. In February, Tshombe and his friends organized 49 of the political parties into a rather loose organization, the Congolese National Convention (CONACO). The elections in the spring of 1965 stirred people into intense political activity. The elections required elaborate preparations; in the electoral district of Leopoldville alone there were 305 candidates on 65 party lists for the area's 7 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 6 seats in the Senate! Actually, it proved impossible to have the thousands of ballots ready for the day set for that election; it was postponed to the end of the voting period.

From his European exile, former Premier Adoula condemned Tshombe and his elections. He demanded that Tshombe be ousted, that the white mercenaries be expelled, and that the rebels be allowed to participate in the new government. Having no faith in Tshombe, he asked that elections be conducted under the supervision of the Organization of African Unity, a proposal that neither Tshombe nor Kasavubu appeared to take seriously.

When the polls closed on April 30, it was revealed that Tshombe and his CONACO followers had won a safe majority in both houses of the National Assembly. Later, because irregularities had been discovered, a special electoral court nullified the results in three districts, where CONACO had won 20 of the 35 seats. New elections were ordered.

Tshombe's real success in subduing the rebellion, in holding elections and in settling financial matters made it appear that Tshombe's mandate was now ended. Would he resign? When would the new parliament hold its first session and have a new government in operation? When would a new president be elected? Who would be the candidates for that high office? The last question was a most significant one because the new constitution had conferred extensive powers on the president. Tshombe and Kasavubu, ambitious and intensely jealous of each other's effort to dominate, had different

opinions on these questions. Both men were most careful to avoid giving public expression to their basic differences although it was generally accepted that they would be rival candidates for the presidency. As a matter of fact, Tshombe never made any formal declaration of his presidential candidacy.

It was only natural that people should wonder just how and when the transition would be made from the provisional government under Tshombe to the new one to be established under the constitution of 1964. Because of the election irregularities and the need for new elections, the National Assembly could not meet on June 30 as originally planned; but no date was set for its convocation. Tshombe believed that his powers as provisional premier would continue until a new president was elected at some date early in 1966 or roughly six months after the dissolution of the old parliament, according to the constitution. There having been no parliament since September, 1963, there was room for differing opinions as to when presidential elections would be held. In the meantime, Tshombe believed that he could fulfill his constitutional obligations by enlarging his cabinet, relinquishing most of the nine ministries that he held and appointing others to the vacated posts.

KASAVUBU VS. TSHOMBE

Without any public acknowledgment of the existence of rivalry with Tshombe (whose selection as provisional premier had been made with reluctance in the summer of 1964), Kasavubu did not want to see his rival as head of the new government. Because of the growing popularity of the Katangan throughout the Congo and even among some of the formerly hostile African states, President Kasavubu was confronted by the need to reach some decision. It was his view that Tshombe's mandate lapsed when the outcome of the parliamentary elections became known—an hour made indefinite by the need for new elections in certain districts where Tshombe's strength had been great. Furthermore, Kasavubu let it be known that he did not want a one-party government, by CON-

ACO, of course. He favored a government of national union, a government in which all provinces would be represented.

With unexpected suddenness the president acted on July 6 by dismissing Godefroid Munongo from his post as minister of the interior in Tshombe's cabinet on the constitutional ground that a member of the cabinet could not simultaneously be governor of a province. Instead of letting Tshombe add a tenth ministry to his nine others, the president appointed Victor Nendaka to the vacant post two weeks later. Having been head of the security police, the nominee had special qualifications for the interior ministry in the opinion of Kasavubu.

The president had another surprise: he convoked the National Assembly in extraordinary session on September 13, even though election returns had not come in from those districts where new elections had been found necessary. When parliament met, there were 155 deputies present instead of the full 166. In organizing parliament for its constitutional duties Tshombe's CONACO succeeded in electing its candidate president of the Chamber of Deputies; the party failed by three votes to do the same in the Senate. To check the growing influence of Tshombe, Nendaka proceeded to organize an opposition party in late September; the party, known as the Congolese Democratic Front, gathered unpredicted strength because of the government's ability to offer jobs to people. It was becoming obvious that a political clash was in the making.

There was a joint session of both chambers of the National Assembly on October 13. Speaking to this body Kasavubu startled everybody by announcing the dismissal of Tshombe's 15-month old government with somewhat curt thanks for its work. The president said that Tshombe had not fulfilled the constitutional requirement to resign on his own initiative when the transitional government's mandate ended with the opening of the new parliament. For this and other violations of the constitution Kasavubu claimed for himself the legal authority to dismiss the premier. This brusque act

appeared to many observers to indicate that the president had set his heart on reelection in 1966 and that victory would be possible only if the growing authority and popularity of his chief rival were curtailed. Defections from CONACO were said to be numerous in the days that followed because, it was later charged, government funds made bribery extensive and successful.

This abrupt dismissal of Tshombe made Westerners and native Congolese anxious concerning the country's immediate future. The act was compared with Kasavubu's dismissal of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 and met with a shudder by those who remembered the ugly consequences of that political coup. There were rumors that Tshombe might again become head of a unified and secessionist Katanga. That Tshombe wanted to reunite Katanga was a fact; for some time he had desired to see the Congo return to the six provinces existing under Belgian rule rather than the 22 provinces of the 1964 constitution. It was known that Tshombe's closest associate, Munongo, ousted minister of the interior, was looking after Tshombe's interests in Katanga, where he was governor of the eastern province.

Kasavubu named Evariste Kimba the new head of government. Like Tshombe, he was a Katangan, but from a different tribe. He was head of the Balubakat party. It is possible that the president reasoned that this Katangan might weaken Tshombe's influence in that rich province. CONACO supporters of Tshombe issued a statement that the naming of Kimba flouted democratic principles by its disregard of the majority of the Chamber of Deputies. No member of CONACO was in the new government. Despite all this Tshombe decided to remain in Leopoldville, to concentrate his efforts on winning the presidency, an ambition that he never stated publicly. Violence broke out in the city; mysterious attacks were made on Tshombe's followers; and it was rumored that plans were afoot to assassinate him.

The constitution required that parliament confirm the government of Kimba before Thursday, November 18. To assure con-

firmation Kasavubu was truly machiavellian. He swore in the new cabinet on Saturday, November 13. Late that night the Leopoldville radio announced that parliament would meet on Sunday morning to confirm the government. Those who sought an explanation for this unusual procedure said that Kasavubu cherished the hope that few supporters of Tshombe would be present and that there would be no difficulty in getting Kimba confirmed.

The political trick misfired. There were only nine absentees when parliament met on Sunday morning. When the votes were counted, Kimba missed confirmation by 13 votes! It was a victory for Tshombe and his party. His followers hailed his triumph. Crowds in the streets cheered him. The Katangan said that he was happy over this victory for democracy. He expressed the hope that Kasavubu would now show more respect for democratic principles and abide in the future by the wishes of the parliamentary majority.

This success must have made Tshombe feel that his chances of winning the presidential election were greatly enhanced. Had Kimba been confirmed, Kasavubu would have been in a strong position to win the presidency: power would have been on his side. But Kasavubu sought to make the most of his defeat. It appeared possible for him to nominate another premier and to control the government until the presidential elections. Since parliament would recess on December 6, confirmation of the new premier could be put off until parliament met again, some time after the new president had been elected.

From now on the struggle between the two political leaders became more bitter. Tshombe openly attacked Kasavubu and charged that the president had embarked on a policy of repression and intimidation, that he respected the law only when it was in his favor. Tshombe said that members of his party were being threatened with arrest, that attempts were being made on his life. He reported that he and his parliamentary followers had been expelled from their hotel

rooms by order of the interior ministry. Charging that Kasavubu's bid for the presidency had grown weaker, Tshombe asserted that he would never serve the government so long as Kasavubu remained its president.

Kasavubu now stepped up his activities against his opponents and critics. The offices of two antigovernment newspapers were sacked; a number of newspapers favorable to Tshombe were closed by government order. The charge was made that Belgians were plotting to restore Tshombe to power, that many Belgian technical experts were conspiring against the government to this end. Two Belgians were actually expelled from the country for engaging in such antigovernment activity. Their crime was that they sought to provide Tshombe with a bodyguard to protect him against assassination.

The interior ministry said that the scheme to protect Tshombe was part of a nationwide conspiracy. Two hundred Congolese students demonstrated before the Belgian embassy, burning a Belgian flag in protest against this so-called conspiracy. There were charges and countercharges about bribing members of parliament. While this fight was going on, Kasavubu called on Kimba a second time to form a "national union" government. Coming so soon after a parliamentary defeat, Tshombe and his many supporters called this move an insult to parliament.

ARMY SEIZES POWER

As these charges and attacks multiplied and made it appear that violence was about to overwhelm the nation, General Joseph Mobutu, head of the new Congolese army, suddenly seized power on the morning of November 25. By an act that reminded people of his removal of Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba from their offices in September, 1960, Mobutu placed Kasavubu in detention for ten days, cancelled the presidential elections, and made himself president for a five-year term.

This surprising coup d'etat has its explanation. While Mobutu complained that the country's two political leaders had disregarded the interests of the Congo during

their bitter rivalry for presidential power, he was primarily concerned about the new policies that Kasavubu was planning for the country. Information about these changes came first from Accra, where Kasavubu attended an October conference of the Organization of African Unity after getting an item about the Congo eliminated from its agenda. It was noted that the president was greeted with unusual warmth by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

The promises made by Kasavubu at Accra disturbed Mobutu profoundly despite his friendship for and support of the president since 1960. It became clear that Kasavubu was seeking the support of Marxist and liberal states in Africa. It was reported that Kasavubu promised to rid the Congo of all foreign mercenaries, not only those from Rhodesia and South Africa, but also Belgian officers who had helped Mobutu to create a dependable army for the Congo. It was reported that Kasavubu wanted Ghanaians to replace the Nigerians who had been training Congolese police. Since, he reasoned, the rebels could not be defeated by arms, they should participate in his government. During his stay in Accra Kasavubu established friendly relations with the Marxist representatives of the former French colony of the Congo in Brazzaville, a country known for its aid to the Congolese rebels and for its friendly relations with the Chinese Communists.

This change of course toward the left alarmed Mobutu as reports arrived in Leopoldville from Accra. In it he saw the defeat of all that he had worked for: the army weakened by the removal of its Belgian officers, his country giving a welcome to its enemies—the rebels, Ghanaians, Chinese Communists, Brazzaville Congolese, and others. The policies adopted by Kasavubu on his return from Accra showed him to be determined to carry out the promises he had made. Diplomatic relations were reestablished with the French Congo in early November. Several Chinese Communists crossed the river to Leopoldville, only to be turned back by Mobutu's order. Attacks on Tshombe were stepped up, with the government radio

attacking him on November 24 as a traitor, assassin, and neo-colonialist working for foreign imperialists.

It was on the night of November 24 that Mobutu met with 14 top army officers and made his final decision. The actual coup was a bloodless one, starting with the radio announcement in the early morning of November 25 that the head of the army had taken over the government. The decision was welcomed by the masses of people, who had feared a recurrence of the bloody events of 1960–1961. It was a surprise to the Belgian officers in the army, other Westerners and most Congolese.

Although Tshombe was quick to express his approval of Mobutu's action, Tshombe knew that it meant his exclusion from power for some time to come. To make his assumption of the presidency constitutional, Mobutu amended the constitution to lower the age limit for the president and to make other necessary changes. He appointed Colonel Leonard Mulamba premier of the new regime with instructions to form a government of national union.

In his policies Mobutu showed himself surprisingly moderate. Kasavubu and Tshombe were allowed their freedom. The ban placed on various publications was removed and papers were told that they could criticize the government as much as they desired. Mobutu assured the nation that there would be liberty of conscience and expression, freedom of press and assembly. Political prisoners were released, of whom the

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Analyzing the prospects for southern Africa, this observer—temporarily setting aside the still uncertain fate of Rhodesia—concludes that “even if within two or three years only Angola, Mozambique, the Republic and South West Africa were left under white control, there is no reason to believe that black Africa—although supported by the United Nations and with the goodwill of the rest of the world—could, with any realistically achievable military or economic pressure, bring about the real collapse of that white control.”

Prospects for Southern Africa

By F. M. G. WILLSON

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FOR A GOOD MANY YEARS the expression “Africa South of the Sahara” has been capable of remarkable misconstruction. Politically, sociologically and economically it accommodates a wide spectrum of human attributes—perhaps, particularly, those of wishful thinking and self-deception. For “Africa South of the Sahara” comprises two very different worlds—one, in the north, where the degree of European settlement was and is only very slight; the other, in the south, where European settlement was and is relatively heavy. On the other hand, white political control was, until nine years ago, unbroken over practically the whole area; since then, in the whole of the northern part (save for one or two tiny enclaves), indigenous African government has succeeded colonialism.

The boundary of African political independence has moved south in a series of sudden jerks and has already swallowed up two of the most northerly areas of considerable white settlement—Kenya, which at independence had 60,000 whites; and the copper mining region of southern Katanga and northern Zambia, with its more numerous and at the same time more nomadic and expatriate white community.

The success of African nationalism in

winning independence has created, particularly in the new states but also in much of the world at large, a feeling of confident certainty that within only a few years “Africa South of the Sahara” will indicate an area fully under black African control. And further, it is asserted that such control will be unhindered by obstructive nonblack minorities and unspoiled by the kind of domestic political infelicities or the international suspicions and disagreements which have dogged other continents in the past. To what extent is this utopian confidence realistic? How far south has the boundary of black African independence actually moved? As it moves, are the prospects for orderly government behind it good? And, above all, is the boundary really going to move far enough south ever to include all “Africa South of the Sahara”?

In December, 1965 (when this article was written), eight territories in southern Africa were controlled by Europeans: either by white minorities in the countries or by European metropolitan powers. They were the Portuguese lands of Angola and Mozambique; the British colonies of Rhodesia (whose white minority government had just declared the country independent), Basutoland, Betsiuanaland, and Swaziland (the last three

known, for historical reasons, as the High Commission Territories); the disputed Trust territory of South West Africa; and the Republic of South Africa.

These eight territories constitute a total area about half the size of the United States, or the same as that of Europe without the U.S.S.R. The total population is 36 million, but its density is only 18 per square mile, as compared with 52 per square mile for the U.S.A., 230 for Europe without the U.S.S.R., and 385 for India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Of the 36 million in southern Africa, about 30 million are African; there are about 3.75 million Europeans; some 1.75 million people of mixed blood (referred to in southern Africa as "Coloureds"); and rather more than .5 million Asians, predominately Indian.

The basic statistics for each territory are given in the accompanying table, from which it can be seen that all but .5 million of the Europeans and a mere handful of the Asians and Coloureds live in the Republic of South Africa. The rough ratio of non-Africans to Africans in the Republic is 1:2.2, and of whites to nonwhites 1:4.5. In South West Africa the corresponding ratios are 1:4.75 and 1:6.66. Elsewhere the proportion is very different. The numbers of Asians and

Coloureds are so small that they can be combined with the Europeans: the resulting ratios of non-Africans to Africans are 1:16.66 in Rhodesia; 1:24 in Angola; 1:39 in Swaziland; 1:56 in Mozambique; 1:123 in Bechuanaland; and 1:250 in Basutoland.

EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTION

The Europeans in southern Africa are an overwhelmingly urban people: in the Republic of South Africa 80 per cent of them live in towns and roughly the same proportion applies in the other territories. The other non-African peoples are very largely concentrated in particular areas — the Coloureds in the southwest part of Cape Province and the Asians in Natal. The Coloureds and Asians are almost as urbanized as the Europeans in the Republic and probably more concentrated in urban areas than are the Europeans in the other territories. At the same time, while the great bulk of the African population is in rural areas, the creation of urban centers by the Europeans has also attracted large-scale African movement into those centers, albeit such movement has been, and is, subject to governmental regulation of varying degrees of effectiveness.

Migratory African labor, not only within

SOUTHERN AFRICA: MID-1965 ESTIMATED POPULATION*
(in thousands)

Territory	Total	African	Asian and Coloured	European
Republic of South Africa	17,750	12,200	2,300	3,250
South West Africa	575	475	25	75
Basutoland	755	752	1	2
Swaziland	300	292.5	1.5	6
Bechuanaland	560	555.5	1	3.5
Rhodesia	4,240	4,000	20	220
Mozambique	7,000	6,878	50	72
Angola	5,215	5,005	30	180
	36,395	30,158	2,428.5	3,808.5

* Totals based on United Nations estimates for 1963 projected on approximate growth rates, 1958-1963. Racial groups estimated from various census and other information.

southern Africa as defined, but also into southern Africa from the north, especially from Malawi, is a major economic phenomenon and a considerable part of it involves migration from a rural to an urban environment. In short, southern Africa now has large urban concentrations and, while exact statistical data is only available for certain areas, it is almost certainly true that the urban community of nonwhites outnumbers that of whites.

The concentration of non-Africans in urban centers should not mislead the reader into believing that the European is little evident in rural areas. Large tracts of rural South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique are set aside for European farming, though here again African labor is employed extensively and resident Africans are far more numerous than Europeans. And above all, over almost the whole of the region, even in the most economically backward tribal reserves, there are more European administrators and police than was ever the case under the colonial regimes further north.

It should be stressed that the African population is growing quickly: between 1958 and 1963, for instance, the Rhodesian growth was calculated as 3.3 per cent annually—one of the world's fastest. European population grows too, but not at a comparable rate. The gap between the racial groups widens steadily and, despite governmental attempts to encourage white immigration, there would seem, realistically, to be no possibility in the foreseeable future that the proportion of white to nonwhite people will alter in favor of the whites. And only in the case of the Republic of South Africa is it reasonably safe to forecast that the white population could reach enough magnitude to challenge the long-cherished black African assumption that the Europeans could one day be spirited or driven out of the continent.

THE HEARTLAND

The heartland of southern Africa is the Republic of South Africa. The most economically advanced country on the continent, South Africa is fairly self-sufficient in

raw materials, except that so far no major petroleum deposits have been found: internal communications are good and there are several rapidly expanding industrial complexes. Britain, the United States, and many other countries in the West have made heavy investments in South Africa, while the Republic takes from the West a long, expensive list of imports. On this sophisticated economy is based a white controlled society whose military strength could certainly outmatch that of any other single African state and very probably could outmatch large combinations of other African states.

The dominant force in contemporary South Africa is the Afrikaner community, whose forebears settled in the Cape nearly 300 years ago. The long-standing enmity between the Afrikaners and the English settlers, who arrived on the scene later, is reflected in the modern division between the largely Afrikaner-supported Nationalist Party, which has been in power since 1948, and the largely English-supported United Party. But it would be wrong to infer that the division is clear-cut, or that there is an enormous gap between the two groups on the major question of the position of the nonwhite peoples. The great bulk of the whites do not want to lose their privileged position and do not regard an early concession to nonwhite political aspirations as desirable. The small amount of serious white opposition to *apartheid* involves Afrikaner as well as English support. This overriding agreement among the whites encouraged the Nationalists to calculate, with real shrewdness, that a breakaway from the Commonwealth (in 1961) and a strong front against nonwhite political progress would strengthen rather than weaken the shared interests of all the whites and thereby soften the bitterness between Boer and Briton.

Volumes have been written on *apartheid*. The practical obstacles to its ultimate fulfilment (apart altogether from any question of its moral indefensibility) have been fully documented. But the unfeasibility of a theoretical social model is no good reason, politically, for not pursuing it. The Na-

tionalists are kept in power primarily because they defend white interests and because they have demonstrated their intention of doing so with thoroughness and, indeed, ruthlessness. At the same time, they have pushed ahead with the application of *apartheid* to the extent of launching the first of the projected "Bantustans," in the Transkei—a rural area peculiarly favorable to the creation of a subordinate African local government unit and no example, in itself, of how the much more difficult areas of close African-European settlement and heavy industrialization could be handled. And it should be remembered that the Transkei represents the furthest extent of the Nationalists' willingness to share political power with the nonwhite peoples.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

South West Africa is a territory whose status has been in dispute since 1946. A German colony before World War I, and still the home of some 20,000 people of German descent, South West Africa was placed under League of Nations mandate in 1918 and its administration entrusted by the British government to the then Union of South Africa. The League's Mandate Commission was replaced in 1946 by the United Nations Trusteeship System but the South African government has so far refused to accept the authority of the United Nations in the matter of the mandate. While there was some direct but fruitless political dialogue between South Africa and a United Nations Good Offices Committee in 1957, the dispute has become a complicated matter of international law and has been before the International Court for several years. A crucial Court decision on the question of jurisdiction is expected early in 1966 but, meanwhile, the South African government has gone ahead, steadily drawing South West Africa into the economic and political system of the Republic. Its economy has been greatly developed, the main wealth being derived from the mining of diamonds and base metals. Early in 1965 it was decided by the South African government to apply the *apartheid* idea more fully to the territory.

In fact, South West Africa has become a fifth province of South Africa.

THE LITTLE THREE

The history of the three High Commission Territories is inseparable from that of South Africa, within which, so long as South Africa retained its membership in the Commonwealth, they were eventually expected to be incorporated. The events of recent South African development, however, have made this solution impossible so far as the British government is concerned and plans are now far advanced for the three territories to become independent states.

The tiny, mountain territory of Basutoland has the great (and unusual in Africa) political advantage of being the home of a homogeneous people and the equally great economic disadvantage of having too many of them. The territory's main export is labor to the Republic. Apart from this, the territory has only water to offer—the Orange River rises in Basutoland—and it has not been tapped to any extent for hydro-electric power within the territory. Thus the future for Basutoland points to a small, poor country, almost entirely dependent on the Republic for its economic existence.

Swaziland, even smaller than Basutoland, faces a more difficult progress to independence because of the struggle between traditional tribal rulers and more radical nationalists, and because of the larger resident European minority and its concern for the major economic features of the country. Swaziland is by far the richest of the High Commission Territories. It has two great economic assets—a large deposit of asbestos and a mountain of iron ore. Both are being heavily exploited and their output exported to South Africa, Japan and elsewhere. A direct railway from the iron-ore mountain to the Mozambique port of Lorenzo Marques was opened in 1964.

Of the three territories, only Bechuanaland stretches well beyond the Republic—indeed, to the present border of Zambia. Most of Bechuanaland is desert, with its habitable parts devoted to cattle ranching. Its major

strategic feature is the railway line which runs just inside its eastern border and joins Rhodesia to the Republic—the only direct “through” railway link between those countries. Under recent constitutional arrangements Bechuanaland is promised independence late in 1966.

DEFIANT RHODESIA

In November, 1965, the white government of Rhodesia declared the territory independent, in defiance of the British. This was the culmination of a movement which followed the failure of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1963), and the independence under African rule of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi).

The colony had been virtually self-governing since 1924 and this, in effect, had meant government by the white minority. In 1961 a new constitution was introduced whose complicated franchise provisions offered the possibility of producing an African majority in the legislature in ten to fifteen years, though the time involved was disputed hotly. The African nationalists themselves rejected the constitution and later split, though both sections continued to oppose the regime.

The November, 1965, declaration of independence carried with it an explicit rejection of any move to share power with the Africans in the foreseeable future. Stringent action by Rhodesia (particularly in 1964–65) has removed any real African political organization from the scene. The British government, in turn, refused to contemplate the use of force, except in the event of widespread disorder, but did support a United Nations resolution calling for heavy economic sanctions. If the white Rhodesians remain united and refrain from retaliatory actions against Zambia and Malawi, it is possible that no internal breakdown of order will occur. If the pressure of the economic measures is effective it may lead to a split within the European ranks which could bring about a situation in which the British government could reimpose control and attempt to find a compromise solution to satisfy both

African aspirations and white settler anxieties.

PORTUGUESE EXTENSIONS

Angola and Mozambique are regarded by the Portuguese as overseas extensions of Portugal itself, and are closely controlled from Lisbon. The Portuguese government has been trying for several decades to settle Portuguese people in the two territories, but the numbers involved have been relatively small. Both territories are very underdeveloped and the extent of advancement for the African peoples—in education and as participants in the government of the societies—has been negligible. Early in 1961 a spectacular African revolt broke out in Angola, largely directed by Angolan exiles in the neighboring and sympathetic Congo Republic (Leopoldville). Within the year the Africans were crushed. Some sporadic guerrilla activity has continued ever since, but the Portuguese seem to be in full control again of all but a small northern section of the territory. In the last year or so there have been reports of fighting in northern Mozambique, where African risings and raids have been planned and directed, apparently, from across the border in Tanzania. However, there is no sign that these skirmishes are causing trouble for the Portuguese comparable to the burden imposed on them by the Angolan revolt.

FORECAST

In the immediate future the only fairly certain political change in southern Africa will be the granting of independence to the High Commission Territories. This, by itself, will do little to alter the overall political status quo: Basutoland and Swaziland, so completely surrounded by and dependent on the Republic and Mozambique, can do little except pursue policies which will avoid any major confrontation with these neighbors. And neither of their neighbors is likely to interfere with the internal affairs of the newly independent states unless these states should become important centers for subversive activity against the South African or Mozam-

bique governments. An independent Bechuanaland, though possessing a strategic railway, will be still very largely dependent on South Africa for its economic well-being. If no other changes take place, the fact of Bechuanaland's independent existence from the border of Zambia to that of South Africa will not indicate any real pressure against the Republic, though it will no doubt be a morale booster for the forces of African nationalism, who will point to unbroken African governorship of territory from the Sahara to within 500 miles of the Cape.

South West Africa—whatever progress is made in the International Court—will certainly remain under firm South African control. Much the same stability can be expected in the Portuguese areas, where sporadic outbreaks of violence might well continue without any real threat to the regime. The most uncertain area is Rhodesia, whose illegal white government is now faced with heavy economic sanctions, some disquiet among the Europeans, the hostility of Rhodesian Africans and the hostility—at least diplomatically—of the majority of the rest of the world.

If the present white government of Rhodesia survives and consolidates its position, then certainly the prospect of major change in southern Africa in the next few years becomes a good deal more remote. A practical relationship of mutual support might well develop out of the existing sympathetic connections between South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Based ultimately on the potential military power of the Republic, such a combination could conceivably last and maintain an internal status quo for a very long time. It could successfully resist all but the most remarkable degree of coordinated world economic hostility (the achievement of which seems to be very unlikely) and any direct military threat other than one whose magnitude would raise such enormous balance of world power problems as to be as little likely of fulfilment as effective economic sanctions.

If this is one possibility, what about an opposite hypothesis? If the white Rhodesian

government were to fall quickly and be replaced by a regime headed for rapid African majority rule, then the unbroken penetration of the southern half of the continent by African nationalism would stretch much more significantly. The buffer now provided by the doubtful outer line of territories would be completely removed and the still remaining white governments of southern Africa would stand face to face with those who abhor their regimes.

But it is fair to ask whether such an event would really hasten the downfall of white control. Unlike the walls of Jericho, the Republic's defenses would need more than trumpet blasts to undermine them; and the Portuguese are past masters at turning a deaf ear to what they regard as unwelcome intrusions on their privacy. In short, even if within two or three years only Angola, Mozambique, the Republic and South West Africa were left under white control, there is no reason to believe that black Africa—although supported by the United Nations and with the goodwill of the rest of the world—could, with any realistically achievable military or economic pressure, bring about the real collapse of that white control. If the already recalcitrant Europeans were seriously threatened, this would almost inevitably stiffen their resistance and thus delay still further any serious modification of their political supremacy.

Will not the more likely development be far less dramatic—and be extended over an unforeseeably long period? If we assume, and it is no light assumption, that the rebellious white Rhodesians can be ousted within a year or two, the probable result will be a reversion to British control for a limited number of years before the granting of independence under an African majority. Thus, full Rhodesian independence would not come about for perhaps at least five years. In such circumstances the prospects for orderly government should be neither better nor worse than those which faced Kenya and Zambia. Such Rhodesian independence, added to the independence of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland,

would probably prove to be the last African nationalist success for many years—perhaps even decades.

Frontal military assault on or major revolution within Angola and Mozambique must be regarded as possibilities, but the first only at a time when independent African states have made far more progress with their economic problems than is the case today; and the second perhaps only if the Portuguese lose faith in themselves—and history gives little sign that such a loss is likely to occur—or change direction radically, as might possibly be envisaged after Salazar's time.

Given a continuance of their intention to stay put, and given the continuance of white control in South Africa, then it is likely that the Portuguese will remain in control of their colonies until a very different situation prevails in the Republic. At such time, Portuguese control might die, as it did in Goa, with a whimper rather than a bang. Even at that probably distant date, the hope of orderly and constructive African government in Angola and Mozambique must be tempered by a realization of the nearly complete lack of preparation which the African population in those lands now has or, in the event of continued Portuguese control, is likely to have.

Continuing our forecast it seems clear that the Republic of South Africa will only change its racial policies and move to a different and more widely acceptable kind of regime, through internal developments over a long period. For the immediate future—and perhaps much longer—the white South Africans will no doubt present a quiet, stubbornly intransigent face to the world, while continuing to keep the nonwhite people (and any too-dissident white people) under close control; world economic sanctions will prove to be ineffectual and such military adventures as may be attempted against the Republic will be met without difficulty. Further, it is difficult to imagine that South Africa will release her hold on South West Africa in the foreseeable future, whatever the rulings of international bodies may be.

The forces which are more likely to modify the situation are as much sociological and economic as political. The development of the notion of *apartheid* will almost inevitably come up against the charge of economic absurdity; there will be a growing gap between the sheer size of white and nonwhite populations: the urbanization and industrialization of the nonwhites and their education, however poor by comparison with that of the whites, will enlarge the growing pool of sophisticated, politically acute nonwhites; and if the present prosperity continues, the living standards of nonwhites—especially of the town dwellers—will rise to a level unprecedented elsewhere in Africa.

If the white South Africans were ever to moderate their governmental policies, to make concessions, they could probably spread those concessions out over a very long time without losing control of the society. In such an event the point of any political clash between white and nonwhite would be reached in an atmosphere quite radically different from that which prevails today. But even any such gradual change of policy would require a political unrest within the white South African community of which there has been no real sign so far. If, as is perhaps more likely, the majority of white South Africans remain defiantly loyal to *apartheid*, then it is only possible to talk in terms of the time when internal revolutionary activity will set in, and even though crushed from time to time, will nonetheless become endemic. Should this be the case, the rigid, orderly government of present-day

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Before joining the faculty of the University of California in the fall of 1965, F. M. G. Willson had been a professor of government in Salisbury, Rhodesia, since 1960. Earlier he had served as a research fellow and lecturer at Oxford. His writings include *The Organization of British Central Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), and *Administrators in Action*, issued by the same publisher in 1961.

BOOK REVIEWS

On Africa

By WALTER A. E. SKURNIK

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado

A HISTORY OF POSTWAR AFRICA.

By JOHN HATCH (New York: Praeger, 1965. 404 pages, bibliography, maps and index, \$8.50.)

A comprehensive account of political events on the African continent, useful as either an introduction for the student or as a readable outline for the layman. The theme is that the African revolution was "anti-colonialist and Africanist rather than national, social, or economic"; in other words, it was a revolution for collective independence.

Rather than using actual political independence as a turning point, the author distinguishes between two key aspects of political development: first, the slow period of "apprenticeship" lasting until the 1950's; and second, the more rapid pace of the nationalist movement. Each major geographical area is thus discussed twice in separate chapters.

AFRICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO TOMORROW. By DAVID HAPGOOD (New York: Atheneum, 1965. 214 pages and index, \$5.00.)

To support his thesis that the peasant—the bulk of the population—is Africa's Forgotten Man, Mr. Hapgood makes two essential points. The first is that present government efforts to raise the peasant's standard of living have been largely failures; the second that the elite is out of tune with the real needs of Africa, interested

primarily in emulating irrelevant European models.

The book is persuasive and well written. It does not, however, recognize that African leaders are well aware of their difficulties, and must cope with immediate political realities so that stability and at least some progress may be achieved.

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF TROPICAL AFRICA. By ROBERT I. ROTBERG. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965. 371 pages, maps, bibliography and index, \$8.95.)

This volume takes a long stride forward toward better knowledge and understanding of Africa's past. Combining prodigious scholarship with a sympathetic view of the subject, the author has synthesized what is known from important written and other sources, dealing as much with the history of the Africans as with that of the European conquest. The story begins about 750,000 years ago and ends with the independence of the new African nations.

THE AFRICAN NETTLE: DILEMMAS OF AN EMERGING CONTINENT. Edited by FRANK S. MEYER. (New York: John Day, 1965. 253 pages, \$5.00.)

The twelve essays in this book, written by journalists, political leaders, and some scholars, range over such topics as the nature of African nationalism, economic problems, the United Nations, democracy, com-

munism, and Western policies; they also include separate chapters on the Congo and South Africa.

The tone is set by the opening sentence of the second essay: "For more than a century, Africa caused no trouble to Europe or America." The trouble is a many-splendored thing, including premature independence, racial nationalism, irresponsibility and ineptitude of African leaders trying to buoy up nearly bankrupt countries, the mirage of the United Nations, the spineless oscillation of the Western powers and, last but not least, the wily tentacles of communism.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MODERN AFRICA. BY WILLIAM A. HANCE (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 618 pages, bibliography, maps and indices, \$12.00.)

An indispensable reference work that belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in Africa. Five introductory chapters on physical, demographic, economic, and political background are followed by seven parts covering the entire continent plus Madagascar and the Mascarenes. These parts examine the land areas, industry, agriculture, trade and transportation of the nations or regions involved. Over 150 maps, charts and tables, plus comments on the prospects for development, enhance the usefulness of this volume.

THE GREAT SAHARA. BY JAMES WELLARD (New York: Dutton, 1965. 333 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

This is a journalist's engrossing narrative of major external human influences in the Sahara over the past 7,000 years. It ranges from rock paintings to the French conquest, discusses Roman occupation, European explorers, select aspects of French penetration, followed by a postscript on contemporary developments. Mr. Wellard's heroes are the Romans, particularly the Third Augusta Legion, which he credits with having brought civilization to the Sahara.

FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA: THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY. EDITED BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS (New York: Walker & Co., 1965. 236 pages, \$2.25, paper.)

This collection of 15 outstanding essays on internal and external political, social and economic problems, grew from papers first read at the 1964 meeting on French-Speaking Africa at Georgetown University. The essays single out important characteristics of north as well as black Africa. Simultaneously, the authors provide food for thought for further comparison with other African areas.

THE CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE. BY VICTOR T. LEVINE (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. 232 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

One of the most intriguing African stories is that of the "reunification" of the French and British Trusteeships. This reviews the geographic, ethnic and historical background, then analyzes the political history of Cameroun and Cameroons until the formation of the Federation. The author concludes that the present confederal government was designed "to permit the emergence of a federal state with full powers, and at a rate that both states can regulate."

POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRENCH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICA. BY RUTH SCHACHTER MORGENTHAU (London: Oxford University Press, 1964. 358 pages, bibliography, appendices and index, \$8.80.)

This is an examination of the development, nature and meaning of political parties in the former "Federation." The first three chapters discuss the impact of French colonial rule, followed by separate chapters on Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Mali. The two concluding chapters discuss the theme of unity (including the Mali

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Rhodesian Declaration of Independence

On November 11, 1965, Prime Minister Ian D. Smith announced that the government of Rhodesia had declared its independence from Britain unilaterally. The text of this proclamation and of Prime Minister Smith's comments on the occasion, as given in a radio broadcast from Salisbury, follow:

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS, in the course of human affairs, history has shown that it may become necessary for a people to resolve the political affiliations which have connected them with another people and to assume among other nations the separate and equal status to which they are entitled, and

WHEREAS, in such event, a respect for the opinions of mankind requires them to declare to other nations the causes which impel them to assume full responsibility for their own affairs,

NOW THEREFORE, we the Government of Rhodesia, do hereby declare:

THAT it is an indisputable and accepted historic fact that since 1923 the Government of Rhodesia have exercised the powers of self-government and have been responsible for the progress, development and welfare of their people.

THAT the people of Rhodesia, having demonstrated their loyalty to the Crown and to their kith and kin in the United Kingdom and elsewhere throughout two world wars and having been prepared to shed their blood and give of their substance in what they believed to be a mutual interest of freedom-loving people, now see all that they have cherished about to be shattered on the rocks of expediency.

THAT the people of Rhodesia have witnessed a process which is destructive of those very precepts upon which civilization in a

primitive country has been built; they have seen the principles of Western democracy and responsible government and moral standards crumble elsewhere; nevertheless they have remained steadfast.

THAT the people of Rhodesia fully support the request of their Government for sovereign independence and have witnessed the consistent refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to accede to their entreaties.

THAT the Government of the United Kingdom have thus demonstrated that they are not prepared to grant sovereign independence to the people of Rhodesia, thereby persisting in maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction over Rhodesia, obstructing laws and treaties with other states in the conduct of affairs with other nations and refusal of assent to necessary laws for the public good, all this to the detriment of the future peace, prosperity and good government of Rhodesia.

THAT the Government of Rhodesia have for a long period patiently and in good faith negotiated with the Government of the United Kingdom for the removal of the remaining limitations placed upon them and for the grant of sovereign independence.

THAT in the belief that procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the nation, the Government of Rhodesia consider it essential that Rhodesia should obtain without delay sovereign independence, the justice of which is beyond question.

NOW THEREFORE we, the Government of

Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty God, who controls the destiny of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty the Queen and earnestly praying that we the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to continue exercising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion in seeking to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may be assured, do by this proclamation adopt, enact and give to the people of Rhodesia the Constitution annexed hereto. God save the Queen!

PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS

Now, if I may, I would like to say a few words to you. Today, now that the final stalemate in negotiations has become evident, the end of the road has been reached.

It has become abundantly clear that it is the policy of the British Government to delay us along, with no real intention of arriving at a solution which we could possibly accept. Indeed, in the latest verbal and confidential message delivered to me last night, we find that on the main principle which is in dispute, the two Governments have moved further apart.

I promised the people of this country that I would continue to negotiate to the bitter end, and that I would leave no stone unturned in my endeavors to secure an honorable and mutually accepted settlement.

It now falls to me to tell you that negotiations have come to an end. No one could deny that we have striven with might and main and at times leaned over backwards to bridge the gap which divides us from the British Government.

My ministers and I have not arrived at this decision without the deepest heartsearching. We have sat for days in ceaseless conference, trying to find any possible way of achieving negotiated independence, as we undertook to the country we would do.

But I would be failing in my duty to all of you who live in Rhodesia if I was to permit this country to drift in the present paralyzing state of uncertainty. The bitter lesson of the

Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty Rhodesia and Nyasaland] is constantly in the forefront of my mind. In that case, matters were permitted to drift and plans for action were formulated too late to prevent the destruction of this noble concept of racial harmony.

However, Rhodesia has not rejected the possibility of racial harmony in Africa. The responsibility for the break-up of the federation was Great Britain's alone. Their experiment failed, and they are now trying to foist the same dogma onto Rhodesia.

We are determined that the same will never be allowed to happen here. Let no one believe that this action today marks a radical departure from the principles by which we have lived, or be under any misconception that now the Constitution will be torn up and that the protection of the rights of all people, which are enshrined in that Constitution, will be abrogated and discarded.

Neither let it be thought that this event marks a diminution in the opportunities which our African people have to advance and prosper in Rhodesia, Far from this being the case, it is our intention, in consultation with the chiefs, to bring them into the Government and Administration as the acknowledged leaders of the African people on a basis acceptable to them.

It is our firm intention to abide by the Constitution. Indeed, we have never asked for anything other than independence on the basis of the present Constitution. And only such amendments are included as are necessary to adapt it to that of an independent country.

With regard to the position of members of Parliament, judges, civil servants and members of the armed forces, as well as the police, provision has been made for all of them to carry on their duties, and all are deemed to have complied with the requirements of the new Constitution.

They will continue to carry on their normal work. All present laws shall continue to operate, and the courts will enforce them in the normal manner.

We are doing no more than assuming the

rights which various British ministers have in the past indicated were ours. And in fact, this Constitution was the one which would carry us to independence.

Let no one be persuaded that this action marks a change in our attitude towards our neighbors in Africa, to whom we have ceaselessly extended the hand of friendship and for whom we have nothing but goodwill and the best of intentions.

We have never sought, nor will we ever seek to interfere, or in any way attempt to influence their policy and their internal affairs. All we ask in return is their goodwill in permitting us to look after what are, after all, our own private and domestic matters.

I wish to make it quite clear, as indeed I have on many occasions in the past, that we in this country have no quarrels whatsoever with the people of Great Britain. The differences of opinion which we have are entirely with successive British Governments.

The people of Britain are the kith and kin of many Rhodesians and the people with whom we have the closest affinity, both in our way of life and in our conception of justice and civilization.

How can anyone suggest that we would harbor hostile sentiments against those with whom we fought shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy in two world wars? Our admiration and friendship for the people of Great Britain is real and enduring.

Let there be no doubt that we in this country stand second to none in our loyalty to the Queen. And whatever else other countries may have done or may do, it is our intention that the Union Jack will continue to fly in Rhodesia and the national anthem continue to be sung.

Most of you, I know, have longed for this day; but a few, on the other hand, have had reservations. However, I would say to you that there can be no future for this great and splendid country of ours if we are to remain drifting in this constitutional twilight.

To those who believe that it would be in our own interests to continue as we are I would point out that the British Prime Minister implied in his speech to Parliament on his

return from Rhodesia that, should the result of the royal commission go against Rhodesia, the British Government reserved the right to call a conference, which further implied the changing of our Constitution as a result.

It would appear that if this is the British Government's real intention, we shall not be allowed to go on as we are—even if there had been a royal commission.

There can be no solution to our racial problems while African nationalists believe that provided they stirred up sufficient trouble they will be able to blackmail the British Government into bringing about a miracle on their behalf by handing the country over to irresponsible rule.

There can be no happiness in this country while the absurd situation continues to exist where people such as ourselves, who have ruled ourselves with an impeccable record for over 40 years, are denied what is freely granted to other countries, who have ruled themselves in some cases for no longer than a year.

There can never be long-term prosperity—which is so necessary for the nurturing of our endeavors, to improve the standard of living and increase the happiness and better the lot of all our people—while the present uncertainty exists.

No businessman could ever seriously contemplate massive long-term investment in a country in which chaos and confusion will always be future possibilities.

Whatever the short-term economic disadvantages may be, in the long term steady economic progress could never be achieved unless we are masters in our own house.

To those of you who fear the short-term effect of economic sanctions, I would say that while we in no way minimize the possible hardship and inconvenience they may bring about, nonetheless we are firmly convinced that in the long run, because of our natural resources and the enterprise of our people, there will be brought about a prosperous and better future for everyone.

Week after week, we have seen businessmen passing through here on their way to South Africa, who with few exceptions say that

while this state of uncertainty continues, they will not even contemplate a serious investigation of the possibility of investment.

However, they also say that once we have solved our constitutional difficulties and are independent, then they will be very interested in undertaking serious investigation and inquiries with a view to investing.

That some economic retributions will be visited upon us, there is no doubt. Those who seek to damage us do not have any great concern for the principles to which they endlessly pay lip service, for if they really believed in these principles, which they ceaselessly proclaim, then they could not possibly deny the many disasters which have been brought about by the premature withdrawal of European influence from countries in Africa and Asia who were nowhere near ready for it.

There is no doubt that the talk of threats and sanctions is no more than appeasement to the United Nations, the Afro-Asian bloc and certain members of the Commonwealth, and undoubtedly some action will be taken.

But I cannot conceive of a rational world uniting in an endeavor to destroy the economy of this country, knowing as they undoubtedly do that in many cases the hardest hit will be the very people on whose behalf they would like to believe they are invoking these sanctions. We, for our part, will never do anything in the nature of taking revenge on any neighboring African state for what other countries may do to us.

But it is nonetheless inevitable that if our economy should contract as a result of such actions taken by others, then what jobs were available would have to be reserved for our own Africans, thus bringing hardship not only on our own people but also to those people from adjoining territories who work here.

If, as some have predicted, there are repercussions elsewhere in Africa, I would warn those people who contemplate taking action that it will be their actions and not ours that have precipitated these events.

Whatever the consequences may be, and whatever difficulties may present themselves, we are a people who in the past have survived and prevailed in circumstances of the utmost

adversity. The mantle of the pioneers has fallen on our shoulders, and we will, I am sure, be able to face any difficulties which may occur, fortified by the same strength and courage which distinguished our forefathers in days gone by.

I do not believe many of the extreme consequences which have been forecast by various would-be Cassandras, both here and abroad, will come to pass. But whatever may befall, I have the profoundest confidence and belief in the determination of our people to stand united and to prevail in the face of any adversity.

The safety of our homes and the freedom of our people alike depend on the conduct of each one of us at this critical time. In the lives of most nations, there comes a moment when a stand has to be made for principles, whatever the consequences. This moment has come to Rhodesia.

I pray—and I hope other Rhodesians will also pray today—that our Government will be given the wisdom and the strength to bring Rhodesia safely through.

I call upon all of you in this historic hour to support me and my Government in the struggle in which we are engaged. I believe that we are a courageous people and history has cast us in a heroic role. To us has been given the privilege of being the first Western nation in the last two decades to have the determination and fortitude to say “so far and no further.”

We may be a small country, but we are a determined people who have been called upon to play a role of worldwide significance.

We Rhodesians have rejected the doctrinaire philosophy of appeasement and surrender. The decision which we have taken today is a refusal by Rhodesians to sell their birthright. And, even if we were to surrender, does anyone believe that Rhodesia would be the last target of the Communists in the Afro-Asian bloc?

We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization and Christianity; and in the spirit of this belief, we have thus assumed our sovereign independence.

God bless you all!

ORDER IN AFRICA

(Continued from page 134)

fense commission of the O.A.U. did recommend to the Council of Ministers that each state, "within its possibilities," allocate one or more military units to be placed at the O.A.U.'s disposal.

Such forces could be used only at the request of one or more member states who "have been victims of extra-African aggression or who suffer serious internal troubles or in case of conflict between two or more member states." The units thus earmarked for the African defense organization would normally remain in their home countries. At the summit meeting in October, 1965, however, no resolution was adopted to establish even such a limited collective security organization. Future insecurity and disorder in Africa will therefore have to be dealt with by the same variety of *ad hoc* arrangements as in the past.

It must be repeated that the most dangerous area of conflict is in southern Africa where white minorities still rule. In South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia, the O.A.U. is often called an alliance for aggression because its Liberation Committee is giving financial and moral support to Africans trying to overthrow their white rulers. In fact, it is rumored that these states have formed their own African security subsystem. According to a *Le Monde* report from Lisbon, September 14, 1965, they have agreed to organize the common defense of meridional Africa against "communist or nationalist subversion." This hardening of positions can only intensify tension among African leaders who condemn imperialism, in the words often used by former President Azikiwe during his fight for Nigerian freedom, as "a crime against humanity."

The frustration resulting from black Africa's inability to muster enough power to overthrow the white redoubt is deepening bitterness along racial lines. Africa's developing system of maintaining order and security will remain in constant danger of

disruption until the racial crisis in Africa's Deep South comes to an end.

THE SUDAN

(Continued from page 146)

Southern people, be it real or imaginary, of being cheated, exploited and dominated.

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Within the Sudan there seems to be government pride in disengagement from the problems of other nations. One Sudanese official is credited with saying, "We think our isolation is perfectly splendid."⁷ Under military or civilian leadership the Sudan has, in the past, tried to assume an aloofness or non-involvement, at least directly, on all international issues.

More recently, the Sudan has come under criticism for supporting irredentist groups in Ethiopia and Chad. In addition, the Sudanese did give official sanction and help to the Congolese rebels although this support has since been withdrawn.

Egypt is the one state with which the Sudan must come to terms. Although the pressing question of the division of the Nile waters, upon which the well-being of each country depends, has been regulated by treaty water distribution remains an area of potential friction which the Sudan is anxious to avoid. Apart from the river problem, the only occasion on which relations between the two countries were strained was a border dispute in 1958, since resolved. But traditional antagonisms die slowly, and there is a long history of disagreement and attempted Egyptian dominance.

The basic aims of the new government were expounded recently by Prime Minister Mahgoub. The prime minister proposes to include measures to deal more firmly with the Southern problem: to stamp out the mutiny and restore freedom of movement, to comba

⁷ Alan W. Horton, "The Splendid Isolation of the Sudan," *A.U.F.S. Report—Northeast Africa Series*, June, 1964.

corruption and exploitation, to strengthen the armed forces, to tighten exchange control and to liberate the national economy from foreign influence. Other reforms envisaged embrace agricultural land and tenants, social and health services, labor laws, education and communications.

Several major problems must be attacked and solved if the new government is to achieve its objectives. Foremost is the establishment of a stable South, either by removing social and political injustices and prejudices and promoting national unity, by granting considerable local autonomy, or by recognizing the three southern provinces as a separate nation. The latter course of action is uppermost in the minds of the majority of South-erners.

Many Sudanese have decreed the fact that past governments have not been able to give the people a sense of purpose. If the present government can come to grips with its South-ern problem, can solve the present economic difficulties, and can provide a sense of purpose, then there need be no Arab-African confrontation in the Sudan.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

(Continued from page 171)

South Africa might disappear for a generation, during which territorial fragmentation, factional terror and political chaos might well predominate. Complete white control, rigidly adhered to beyond a certain point in the social and economic development of the nonwhite peoples, must almost inevitably be followed by a breakdown of the society involved—a breakdown which, in the case of South Africa, could prove more frightening than the spectacle of the Congo after 1960.

This survey has not touched on such wider considerations as the outbreak of major international war, or a spread of Communist control in independent black Africa. The range of alternatives can be played indefinitely. The writer is content to close with the suggestion that it is highly likely that "Africa South of the Sahara" will not indi-

cate an orderly continental control by black Africans until well into the twenty-first century.

RIVALRY IN THE CONGO

(Continued from page 164)

best known was Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's political heir. To allay the fears of outsiders the new president said that his regime would maintain treaty relations with the United Nations and with the Organization of African Unity; parliament would have to approve the Congo's membership in OCAM.

As instructed, Mulamba formed a government of national union, to which each of the 22 provinces named one candidate. It was sworn in November 28. It is worth noting that the Congolese Democratic Front outnumbered CONACO, 12 members to 8.

On December 12 Mobutu addressed some 30,000 Congolese in the Baudouin Stadium to explain his act and to announce his plans for the future. He talked much of the graft and corruption that had flourished in the government, of the serious decline in the production of food and of other crops, and of the increase in the national debt. He said that the nation would have to roll up its sleeves to work hard on these great problems. The first year, he warned, would be one of suffering, with no increases in salaries for civil and military servants. The first salary increases would go to Congolese workers, those who had benefited least during the year of independence. He told of plans he had for producing steel and for developing the hydroelectric resources of the Inga Falls. On the whole, it was not a speech to comfort seekers of privilege and political favors.

Before the end of the year 23 nations had recognized the new government, among them Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Belgium, France, the Vatican, and the United States. Too little time has elapsed since these exceptional events for opposition to Mobutu to become organized, although there is already some grumbling. It will be a miracle if the Congo at long last finds the stability it sorely needs.

WEST AFRICA

(Continued from page 158)

were far from agreed on the nature of "unity" that they wished to achieve.

Even at the level of interstate relations, the translation of the sentiment for unity into governmental policy encountered serious obstacles. The prime example was the unwillingness of the governments of Senegal and Gambia to take more than extremely limited steps toward unity, i.e., signing treaties for consultation in and coordination of defense and foreign policies.

Gambia became independent in mid-February, 1965. A miniscule country of 4,000 square miles, dependent almost entirely upon peanuts, Gambia has but one major resource: the river that gives the country its name. The river is scarcely utilized for transport, since a "temporary" border settlement in 1889 separated the British-ruled banks of the river from French-administered Senegal. During the colonial period, the two territories developed distinctive patterns of trade; the French-speaking and English-speaking elites could not communicate easily. As self-government approached, the British government did not press Gambia into the embrace of Senegal.⁶

The "Senegambian" issue embodied the fundamental problem of interstate relations in West Africa. Where the desire for national autonomy conflicts with the aspiration for interstate unity, state sovereignty will likely prevail. West African countries have only recently acquired their independence. Until this independence is consolidated—until the problems of political authority and economic impoverishment have been solved—unity will remain a slogan rather than a fact.

Thus, 1965 was a year of cautious consolidation of gains in West Africa, a year in which difficulties were more evident than the

optimistic prospects. The lessons were clear: nation-building is a long-term project, requiring economic growth and the development of stable political patterns.

Can military intervention create the necessary conditions for stability and growth, given the difficulties encountered in both multi-party states (Dahomey and Nigeria) and single-party countries (Upper Volta)? This question—which seemed remote at the start of 1965—emerged as the basic problem facing West African states early in 1966. Further gravitation of power into military hands may be hard to avoid, as long as the legitimate exercise of political authority remains in question.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 173)

Federation episode) and the trend toward single-party regimes. The text and the twelve appendices (on economic and political data) provide a comprehensive view of political developments in French West Africa from World War II to ca. 1961.

POLITICS IN THE CONGO: DECOLONIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE
BY CRAWFORD YOUNG (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 608 pages bibliography, maps, tables and index \$12.50.)

Told in 22 compact and well-written chapters, this is the story of the Congo (Leopoldville) from its beginnings to the immediate postindependence period, with an epilogue on the 1964 insurrections. The material covers three parts: part I reviews the assumptions and policies of the Belgians; part II the Congolese response, and part III the tendencies set into motion by national independence.

The author finds that the transfer of power was relatively empty since it was not accompanied by that of authority. The Africans' performance since independence shows "very real achievement" which, unfortunately, has been jeopardized by the

⁶ Claude E. Welch, Jr., *Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), chapter VI.

tumult of more recent rebellions. An appendix discusses some interesting methodological assumptions.

EAST WIND OVER AFRICA: RED CHINA'S AFRICAN OFFENSIVE. By JOHN K. COOLEY (New York: Praeger, 1965. 240 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$5.95.)

This journalist offers a detailed review of the activities of the People's Republic of China on the African continent. Of the 23 chapters, two are introductory, 4 are analyses of particular methods used by Peking, one discusses Formosa in Africa, another is a theoretical consideration of "Mao's Master Plan," whereas the others cover different areas of Africa. Mr. Cooley is careful to point out that China takes advantage of turmoil without creating it, and that African leaders are wary of political interference but grateful for assistance. He underlines that the Chinese are actively trying to curtail the influence of both the Western nations and the Soviet Union, and their forays are not to be taken lightly.

AFRICAN BATTLELINE: AMERICAN POLICY CHOICES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. By WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN (New York: Harper and Row, 1965. 148 pages and index, \$3.50.)

This book is an articulate essay by the president of the African-American Institute on past, present, and future United States policy toward the eight nations or territories in southern Africa. Except for the introduction and conclusion, each chapter reviews relevant background in these areas and suggests changes in American policy. The underlying theme is that change is imminent and probably drastic and that American indifference or ignorance have run their course.

Mr. Nielsen's views are balanced and reflect the dilemma in reconciling value commitments and interests as well as responsibility, such as devotion to government by consent vs. strategic-economic considerations. His counsel is to expand

American commitments in an area which cannot be dealt with in "normal" fashion. While avoiding the delusion of omnipotence, we ought to encourage political change by "the consistent and active application of persuasion and influence." This means a joint effort with African and European nations for the coordination of increased economic and educational assistance and diplomatic initiatives and, above all, a thorough reexamination of the conceptual framework that has guided United States policy in the past.

THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF AFRICA. Edited by RUPERT EMERSON and MARTIN KILSON (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1965. 168 pages, biographical notes and bibliography, \$1.95 paper, \$4.95 hardbound.)

A remarkable collection of short, pithy extracts from the writings of some 30 African intellectuals and leaders. Much of the material is not easily accessible; some of it is not widely known even among students of Africa. The effect of the book is that of a study in depth—and breadth—of past and present facets of nationalism; the reader will be struck by the responsibility and wisdom of Africans.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS. By PAUL FORDHAM (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1965. 237 pages, tables, maps and index, \$1.45.)

The first four chapters of this outstanding volume discuss general land characteristics, subsistence economies, the European political conquest, and the relations between natural resources and economic development. The remaining nine chapters (little more than half the book) are regional studies of West, Central, East, and Southern Africa. Although political criteria at times determine the organization of the book, it contains essential background for history and politics, highlights the uneven pace of economic development in Africa, and serves usefully as an aid for an intelligent introduction to Africa.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of January, 1966, to provide a day-to-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

By MARY KATHARINE HAMMOND

Instructor, Department of History, Ohio Northern University

INTERNATIONAL

Commonwealth of Nations

Jan. 11—At the opening of the Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia in Lagos, Nigeria, Britain's handling of the rebellion is strongly criticized by African members, who assert Britain should have used force against Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's regime. In the first Commonwealth conference to meet outside London, 19 of 22 Commonwealth members are present.

Jan. 12—The Commonwealth conference ends after agreeing to meet again in July if the Rhodesian rebellion has not ended. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson tells the group that economic sanctions will be sufficient to topple the Smith government.

Disarmament

Jan. 27—After a four-month recess, the 17-nation Disarmament Conference reconvenes at Geneva.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Jan. 17—The six members of the executive commission of the Common Market meet for the first time since July 1, 1965, when France began her virtual boycott of the group. France outlines 10 major proposals to reduce the independence and initiative of the commission.

Jan. 18—Unable to reach agreement on France's demands for curbing the power of the executive commission, the six foreign ministers of the Common Market countries agree to reconsider the matter at a January 28 meeting.

Jan. 30—Representatives of the six Common Market nations agree to resume normal deliberations within a few weeks, ending the French boycott.

Tricontinental Solidarity Conference

Jan. 4—In Havana, about 500 delegates from almost 100 African, Asian and Latin American nations open the first Tricontinental Congress to discuss ways of combatting imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Jan. 13—The Havana Conference urges a world campaign of economic aid for the Vietcong in South Vietnam and condemns the U.S. as the aggressor against the Dominican people.

United Nations

Jan. 19—The governing council of the U.N. development program approves 82 preinvestment projects at a cost of \$254.5 million. Of the total, \$104.1 million will be financed by the development program and the remainder by the governments of the developing nations involved in the projects.

Jan. 20—Secretary-General U Thant suggests that all elements of the South Vietnamese people, presumably including the Vietcong, should be represented in the country's post-war government.

ARGENTINA

Jan. 10—An 18-day-old strike of municipal workers in Buenos Aires erupts in a street battle between strikers and police; 50 demonstrators are arrested.

AUSTRALIA

- Jan. 19—Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies announces he is retiring from leadership of the government, a post he has held since 1949.
- Jan. 20—Governor-General Lord Casey designates Treasury Minister Harold Holt as successor to Prime Minister Menzies.

BRAZIL

- Jan. 3—The government permits prices to rise as much as 30 per cent for a variety of consumer goods, including beef, gasoline and cigarettes.
- Jan. 10—President Humberto Castello Branco replaces the minister of education, Flavio Suplicy de Lacerda, with Pedro Aleixo, leader of the government majority in the chamber of deputies. Mr. Suplicy brought about a political impasse between the government and student organizations when he prohibited student political activities.

BURMA

- Jan. 2—The revolutionary government bans the publication of all privately-owned foreign-language newspapers. Four pro-Peking Chinese newspapers and four Indian papers are affected.
- Jan. 6—The government acts to stop major black market activities. Troops confiscate all illegal goods in Rangoon shops and in the central market.

BURUNDI

- Jan. 10—The government orders the expulsion of U.S. Ambassador Donald Dumont and two of his staff for alleged contact with antigovernment conspirators.

CAMBODIA

- Jan. 3—The government informs the U.N. that it will make armed attacks into South Vietnam if there are further violations of its territory or air space by U.S. or South Vietnamese forces. It also warns it will accept the help of other countries in resisting future attacks.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

- Jan. 1—Chief-of-Staff Colonel Bedel Bokassa seizes power and ousts President David Dacko. The new government announces that all nationals of Communist China will be expelled within 48 hours.

CEYLON

- Jan. 8—The government declares a nationwide emergency and imposes press censorship following a day of rioting in which a Buddhist monk is killed and 91 persons are injured. The clash between rioters and police results from a revival of the long-standing language conflict, with the rioters protesting government concessions to the Tamil-speaking minority.
- Jan. 11—Parliament approves legislation giving the Tamil minority the right to conduct business in its own language.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

- Jan. 4—An Indian foreign ministry spokesman reports that China has called home all its ambassadors in Asia, Africa and Europe for "urgent consultations."
- Jan. 9—A major official in the foreign trade ministry rebukes Cuba's Premier Fidel Castro over his charge that Peking broke a trade agreement with Havana. China denies that it has signed a long-term contract to supply 250,000 tons of rice a year to Cuba in return for 370,000 tons of sugar.
- Jan. 13—The government reveals that China is giving assistance to a new underground organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Malaysian government.
- Jan. 18—The Communist party newspaper declares that a new worldwide movement against the influence of the U.S. and the Soviet Union has begun.
- Jan. 19—All newspapers in Peking carry a lead article warning the army to make full preparations for a nuclear or conventional attack by the U.S. at an early date.
- Jan. 26—A Peking broadcast hints that not all military men agree that the nation has the ability to fight the U.S. The party vigorously demands obedience from the

army and acceptance of the party's strategic doctrines.

CUBA

(See also *China, People's Republic of*)

Jan. 2—Premier Fidel Castro announces that Communist China has drastically reduced its trade with Cuba for 1966.

Jan. 7—The government announces a 50 per cent cut in the ration of rice because of China's decision to exchange only 135,000 tons rather than the expected 285,000 tons of rice.

Jan. 12—The ministry of commerce rejects China's assertion that Premier Castro lied when he told his people the facts about the rice-sugar exchange agreement.

DAHOMY

Jan. 6—Foreign Minister Emile Derlin Zinsou arrives in France following the two-week-old army takeover in Dahomey. He assures French officials that the former colony wishes to continue its close ties with Paris.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Jan. 3—Provisional President Hector Garcia Godoy tells the nation that in an effort to relieve mounting tension major military men, from both the Dominican armed forces and from the former rebel group, are being sent abroad.

Jan. 6—The government lists 34 military leaders for assignment abroad. Included is Commandore Rivera Caminero, minister of the armed forces, and Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deno, leader of the rebel group.

Rebelling against transfer orders, the armed forces seize the government radio-television station and the national telecommunications center.

Jan. 8—Troops of the Inter-American Peace Force recover the communications points and return them to government control.

Jan. 14—The government prohibits the return to the country of eight leading Communists who have been attending the Tri-continental Congress in Cuba.

Jan. 22—Colonel Caamaño and three other ex-rebel leaders leave the country to accept diplomatic posts in London. The regular army officers ordered abroad continue to resist their transfer.

FRANCE

Jan. 8—President Charles de Gaulle is inaugurated for his second seven-year term. He asks Premier Georges Pompidou to remain at the head of the new government.

Jan. 10—A French newspaper, *L'Express*, publishes what is termed an eyewitness report of the alleged beating and stabbing of Ben Barka October 30. The exiled Moroccan leftist opposition leader was kidnapped in Paris in daylight. The purported eyewitness is Georges Figon, an ex-convict sought by the police. He claims that the Ben Barka affair had the approval of high-ranking French officials.

A Communist party official asserts that the number of card-carrying Communists in France increased by 39,100 in 1965. In 1964, party membership was 420,000.

Jan. 17—Georges Figon is found shot to death in his apartment, an alleged suicide after policemen force their way into his room to arrest him.

Jan. 19—A communiqué issued after a cabinet meeting declares that the Ben Barka kidnapping was a crime "organized abroad with the complicity of agents of French special services or police." President de Gaulle dismisses Paul Jacquier, an air force general, as head of the department of alien documentation and counterespionage. The organization is removed from the direct control of Premier Georges Pompidou and placed under the defense minister.

The Moroccan ambassador to Paris terms the Ben Barka affair "purely a French matter" and declares that hints that Moroccan Interior Minister General Oufki was involved in the kidnapping are unfounded.

Jan. 20—After hints of his involvement and Moroccan denials, France issues an international warrant for the arrest of Morocco's

Interior Minister, General Mohammed Oufkir.

Jan. 23—In the face of Moroccan rejection of international arrest warrants, France recalls its ambassador to Morocco.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Jan. 5—The cabinet approves a draft federal budget of \$17.3 billion, \$2 billion below last year's budget.

Jan. 17—A German cabinet minister states publicly for the first time that his government is prepared to yield former German lands in the east to reach a frontier settlement with Poland. The minister of refugee affairs asserts in *Der Spiegel* that some "sacrifices" must be made if Germany is to be reunified.

Jan. 26—Germany asks Moscow to recall a Soviet trade official accused of spying on West German scientific research projects.

Jan. 31—It is reported from Berlin that since the beginning of 1964 West Germany has secretly ransomed 2,600 political prisoners from East Germany.

GREAT BRITAIN

(See *United Kingdom*)

INDIA

(See also *Pakistan* and *U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 10—At Tashkent in the U.S.S.R., Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan agree to withdraw their armies in Kashmir to positions they held before last fall's fighting. They also agree to settle their dispute peacefully, not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, to reestablish full diplomatic relations and to repatriate prisoners of war.

Jan. 11—Prime Minister Shastri dies of a heart attack at Tashkent.

Jan. 16—A right-wing Hindu party, the Jan Sangh, condemns the Indian-Pakistani agreement and calls on the nation to oppose it.

Jan. 19—Mrs. Indira Gandhi, daughter of the late Jawaharlal Nehru, is elected prime

minister by legislators of the Congress Party.

Jan. 25—Indian and Pakistani troops begin withdrawing along the cease-fire line in Kashmir.

Jan. 26—Prime Minister Gandhi says her most important job is to see that 485 million Indians are fed in the face of the worst drought of the century.

IRAQ

Jan. 4—In a protest note, the government officially accuses Iran of permitting Kurdish insurgents to use Irani territory to shell Iraqi army border positions.

Jan. 6—President Abdel Salam Arif warns that his army is strong enough to crush any attempted usurpation of Iraqi territory.

Jan. 12—Premier Abdel Rahman al-Bazzaz announces that his country and Iran have agreed on proposals to settle their border dispute.

IRISH REPUBLIC

Jan. 3—Irish navy gunners open fire on fellow Irish Republic fishing boats attacking trawlers from Northern Ireland. The southern Irish are defying an order from their government that, under a five-year agreement, Northern boats must be allowed to fish herring areas in the Republic's territorial waters.

ISRAEL

Jan. 12—Premier Levi Eshkol's new coalition cabinet receives a 71-to-41 vote of confidence from the Knesset.

Jan. 19—For the first time since 1948, Negev Bedouins are allowed to move north without permits from a Jewish military governor. Central Galilee, where 120,000 Arabs live, is opened to Arabs from other parts of the country.

ITALY

Jan. 21—Following chamber of deputies defeat of a government bill to establish state nursery schools, Premier Aldo Moro and his coalition cabinet resign.

MONGOLIA

Jan. 15—Mongolia and the Soviet Union sign a 20-year mutual assistance pact and reaffirm their "complete unity" in the face of Chinese threats to divide the world Communist movement.

MOROCCO

(See also *France*)

Jan. 23—The government rejects international warrants issued by France for the arrest of Interior Minister Mohammed Oufkir and two of his chief aides.

NIGERIA

Jan. 9—A wave of rioting, looting and the burning alive of political rivals erupts throughout the country on the eve of the meeting in Lagos of British Commonwealth leaders to discuss the Rhodesian crisis. Leaders of the opposition Action Group have been predicting renewed violence to embarrass Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the conference's host.

Jan. 13—The government tells parliament that more than 160 persons have been slain in the continuing post-election rioting in the Western Region. The violence follows evidence of widespread vote-rigging that returned the ruling regional government to power in elections three months ago.

Jan. 15—Dissident junior army officers stage a coup in Lagos. The prime minister disappears, and the finance minister and two regional prime ministers are assassinated.

Jan. 16—Army forces rally around the federal government. Major General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi takes control and announces the abolition of the constitution, abolition of the offices of prime minister, president and all civilian ministers. The four regions are to be run by military governors.

Jan. 17—Aguiyi-Ironsi declares that all army units throughout the country have sworn loyalty to the new regime. He says the army will run the country until a new constitution is adopted.

Jan. 19—Authoritative sources indicate that

Aguiyi-Ironsi is firmly in control after having staged a counter coup. He was not one of the original conspirators, all of whom are reported killed or forced to submit to the general's rule.

Jan. 21—Aguiyi-Ironsi announces the formation of a supreme military council and a federal executive council with himself as head of both units.

Jan. 22—The body of Prime Minister Balewa, who was kidnapped by the young officers during the coup, is discovered.

Jan. 25—The government stresses its interim nature and promises the country a new constitution "prepared in accordance with the wishes of the people."

Jan. 28—Aguiyi-Ironsi announces reforms; he promises that the new military regime will eliminate corruption "with ruthless efficiency" and will investigate those who use public office for private gain. In his first policy declaration, he also pledges measures to increase incentive for foreign investment in Nigeria.

PAKISTAN

(See also *India* and *U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 14—Leaders of four opposition parties join in criticizing the Indian-Pakistan agreement signed at Tashkent because it fails to settle the Kashmir dispute. Student riots against the agreement result in two deaths.

Jan. 15—President Mohammad Ayub Khan appeals for national unity and discipline in accepting the Tashkent agreement.

Jan. 16—Four officials of two opposition political parties are arrested on charges of violating the ban on public gatherings.

POLAND

Jan. 8—Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski is barred by the government from leaving Poland on the eve of his scheduled departure for the Vatican to celebrate the 1000th anniversary of Polish Christianity. He is accused of trying to win Poland over to the West.

Jan. 30—In a sermon at the Basilica of Jasna Gora Monastery at Czestochowa, Stefan

Cardinal Wyszynski asserts that the Roman Catholic Church of Poland cannot be overcome by any temporal power.

RHODESIA

(See also *Intl, Commonwealth of Nations and Zambia*)

Jan. 1—Prime Minister Ian Smith announces proposals to resume gasoline supplies to Zambia and to cut a punitive royalties charge on Rhodesian coal, vital for Zambia's copper mines and railways.

Jan. 10—Amid reports of a major devastating drought, the government closes off all drought-stricken tribal areas.

Jan. 15—The country's only oil refinery begins a step-by-step process of shutting down since its supply of crude oil is exhausted.

Jan. 17—Prime Minister Smith says in a nationwide broadcast he is willing to reopen negotiations with Britain with the firm understanding that Rhodesia is to remain independent.

Jan. 21—Following Queen Elizabeth's action ordering a reprieve for a condemned black Rhodesian, the government says it does not recognize the Queen's authority to interfere in Rhodesia's internal affairs.

SPAIN

Jan. 17—A U.S. B-52 bomber collides with a U.S. jet refueler and crashes.

Jan. 21—As U.S. and Spanish officials continue the search near the site of the plane crash for missing nuclear devices, Spanish physicians find slight traces of radioactivity on several Spanish searchers.

Jan. 29—Information Minister Manuel Fraga Iribarne tells the cabinet that Spain has prohibited U.S. planes carrying nuclear weapons from flying over Spanish territory. At least one of the weapons lost in the January 17 crash has not yet been located.

SYRIA

Jan. 2—A 12-day governmental crisis ends with the announcement of a new 26-man cabinet headed by a moderate, Salah el-Bitar.

U.S.S.R., THE

Jan. 3—The leaders of India and Pakistan meet in Tashkent at the invitation of Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin in an effort to solve the 18-year Kashmir dispute. (See also *India*.)

Jan. 6—Aleksandr Shelepin, heading a delegation of high-ranking Soviet experts on armaments and strategic missiles, flies to Hanoi.

Jan. 9—Premier Kosygin reenters the Tashkent talks to avoid a stalemate between Indian and Pakistani leaders.

Jan. 14—An official communiqué says the Soviet Union will increase its commitment to aid North Vietnam's war effort and supports Hanoi's four conditions for peace talks with South Vietnam.

Jan. 21—The foreign ministry reports that Newcomb Mott, an American tourist sentenced to 18 months hard labor for illegally crossing the Soviet border, has committed suicide while on his way to a Soviet labor camp.

Jan. 22—The Soviet Union invites U.S. embassy observation of an autopsy to be performed on Newcomb Mott.

Jan. 24—The U.S. embassy says that the autopsy on Mr. Mott revealed "multiple lacerations" on his body in addition to the major deep throat cut.

Jan. 25—The first secretary of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, is appointed chairman of a commission to draft a new collective-farm charter.

Jan. 31—Luna 9, an unmanned space rocket, is fired toward the moon in an apparent attempt at a "soft" landing; four previous Soviet attempts have failed.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Rhodesia*)

Jan. 1—U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Arthur Goldberg confers in London with Prime Minister Harold Wilson with regard to the U.S. drive for a Vietnam peace.

Jan. 7—Britain, Canada and Australia agree to an emergency plan to send grain to

drought-stricken areas of central Africa, including Rhodesia.

Jan. 18—The Rhodesian chief justice, Hugh Beadle, flies to London for talks with Prime Minister Wilson.

Jan. 20—Queen Elizabeth commutes the death sentence of a black African prisoner in Rhodesia, thus setting up a legal and moral test in the conflict with the Rhodesian rebel regime.

Jan. 27—In a special by-election in Hull, the Labour candidate for Parliament wins by a record-breaking margin. With the death of a Conservative M.P., Prime Minister Wilson's majority in Commons is raised from 2 to 4.

Jan. 30—The Board of Trade announces a total boycott of Rhodesian goods effective February 2.

UNITED STATES, THE Civil Rights

Jan. 10—The Georgia House of Representatives votes to bar Julian Bond, a Negro, from taking his seat as a state representative. Seven other Negro legislators are seated without objection. Bond is a pacifist critic of U.S. policy in Vietnam and has stated he admires those with courage to burn their draft cards if their consciences lead them to do so.

Jan. 11—The Justice Department files its first suits against southern school districts which have allegedly failed to desegregate.

Jan. 13—In Birmingham, Alabama, police use nightsticks on civil rights demonstrators refusing to move from downtown intersections. The demonstrations, involving many high school students, protest the slow pace of Negro voter registration.

Jan. 18—Georgia's Governor Carl Sanders schedules a special election February 23 to fill the House seat denied to Julian Bond.

Jan. 22—The Alabama state Democratic committee removes the "white supremacy" slogan from the party's ballot emblem.

Jan. 24—Federal voting examiners arrive in Birmingham to help register Negroes.

Foreign Policy

Jan. 3—In the first major accord between Cairo and Washington since relations became strained a year ago, the U.S. signs a \$55-million aid agreement with the U.A.R.

Jan. 5—Arthur Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., tells U Thant by letter that the U.S. would welcome the efforts of a U.N. member in reaching a negotiated peace in Vietnam.

Jan. 6—The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee calls U.S. policy in Vietnam hypocritical, aggressive and murderous and urges Americans to seek valid alternatives to the draft.

President Lyndon Johnson receives pledges of support for U.S. Vietnam policy from 477,000 students in 322 universities and colleges.

Jan. 7—Republican Senator Everett Dirksen (Ill.) says the U.S. should achieve a complete military victory before entering peace negotiations.

The Senate Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield (Mont.), returning from a global tour, warns that if peace negotiations fail, the war may escalate into a general war on the Asian mainland.

Jan. 10—In answer to a charge by Yale Professor Staughton Lynd that the U.S. has not directly approached North Vietnam about peace negotiations, a White House spokesman declares that the North Vietnam government has accepted a secret letter from the U.S. government, in a meeting between a U.S. official and a Hanoi representative.

Jan. 11—Officials sources say Hanoi has had two weeks to reply to a secret U.S. message but has thus far given no indication of any interest in peace negotiations.

The State Department asks Burundi to recall its ambassador to Washington and protests Burundi's order expelling the U.S. ambassador and two members of his staff.

Senator Dirksen warns his Republican party colleagues to consider the possible consequences before advocating the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. He points out

that Saigon and its vital harbor are open to retaliation.

Jan. 13—Following the funeral of Prime Minister Shastri, Vice President Hubert Humphrey confers for two hours in New Delhi with Soviet Premier Kosygin.

Jan. 18—Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman says the U.S. will contribute \$130 million toward the 1966–1968 U.N. World Peace Program.

A resolution supporting administration efforts to achieve a treaty limiting the spread of atomic weapons is backed by 53 senators.

Jan. 19—It is reported that Britain, France, Japan, the Communist governments of Europe and a number of nonaligned nations have asked the U.S. to continue its pause in the bombing of North Vietnam well beyond the holiday cease-fire now in effect.

Jan. 20—Speaking at ceremonies in Independence, Missouri, the President appeals to North Vietnam to come to the negotiating table. He also proposes a cooperative international attack on disease, hunger and illiteracy.

Jan. 26—Appearing before a congressional committee for the administration's foreign aid program, Secretary of State Dean Rusk acknowledges that some U.S. aid to South Vietnam has been pocketed by corrupt U.S. and Saigon officials.

Jan. 28—Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. W. Fulbright and other members of the committee challenge the constitutionality of the administration's Vietnamese involvement, in a 4-hour interrogation of Secretary of State Rusk by almost all 19 committee members.

Jan. 29—Senator Wayne Morse (D., Oregon) suggests that the Congress rescind its 1964 resolution allowing the President to take "all necessary measures" to repel or prevent aggression against Southeast Asian members in Southeast Asia. He also offers a resolution asking the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to conduct "a full and complete investigation" of all U.S. policies in Vietnam.

Jan. 30—U.S. Representative to the U.N.

Arthur Goldberg rebuts Ho Chi Minh's rebuff of U.S. offers to negotiate; he declares that the North Vietnamese president's action will not keep the U.S. from seeking an honorable settlement. (See also *North Vietnam*, Jan. 29.)

Jan. 31—President Johnson announces that he has ordered U.S. forces to resume bombing of military targets in North Vietnam; he also reveals plans to ask the U.N. Security Council to consider ways to end the war in Vietnam. Dean Rusk cites Hanoi's "negative" response to U.S. peace feelers.

Arthur Goldberg submits a U.S. resolution to the U.N. Security Council asking the Council to call a conference to establish a durable peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Debate is scheduled for tomorrow.

Government

Jan. 3—The Defense and Commerce departments and the General Services Administration order their agencies to buy steel "at the lowest possible price." Gardner Ackley, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, denounces the \$5 a ton price increase announced by three steel companies.

Jan. 4—Following a two-month recess, the House Committee on un-American Activities resumes its hearings on the Ku Klux Klan.

Jan. 5—A compromise is reached on a steel price increase; the major steel companies announce they will increase the price on some structural items by \$2.75 a ton, while cutting other items by \$9 a ton.

A federal grand jury indicts Robert Baker, former secretary to the Senate Democrats, on nine counts. He is charged with receiving \$137,000 under false pretenses and of evading taxes on much of the money.

Jan. 6—A House subcommittee investigating the Ku Klux Klan recommends that Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton and six other leaders be cited for contempt of Congress.

Jan. 10—The second session of the 89th Congress convenes.

President Johnson names Dr. James I.

Goddard, director of the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta, Georgia, as Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration.

Jan. 12—In his State of the Union message, the President pledges to remain in Vietnam "until aggression is stopped"; he also promises to expand the Great Society. He calls for four-year terms for Representatives, fair housing laws, a cabinet-level department of transportation and legislation dealing with public service strikes.

Jan. 13—The administration sends Congress a proposal outlining a graduated system for income tax withholding to replace the present flat 14 per cent.

Robert C. Weaver is named secretary of the new Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Jan. 17—The Senate gives unanimous approval to Robert Weaver, the first Negro named to a cabinet post.

Sargent Shriver gives up his job as director of the Peace Corps to devote full-time to the expanded antipoverty program. Jack Hood Vaughn, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, will become director of the Peace Corps.

Jan. 18—President Johnson orders an increase in the 3.75 per cent interest rate on government savings bonds, but he does not specify the new rate.

The President asks Congress to approve U.S. participation in the Asian Development Bank.

The Senate approves a bill to protect stretches of wild rivers throughout the U.S.

Jan. 19—Congress is asked to appropriate \$12.8 billion in additional funds for the current fiscal year, primarily for expenses in Vietnam.

Jan. 20—Congress receives administration proposals for a four-year term for Representatives and for abolition of the Electoral College.

Jan. 24—Congress receives the administration's \$112.8 billion budget for fiscal 1967. Defense spending is set at \$58.3 billion, a \$4.2 billion increase. Health, education and antipoverty programs call for \$14

billion, a \$3 billion increase. Despite proposed increased taxes on airline tickets telephone services and new cars, and higher parcel post rates, a \$1.8 billion deficit is predicted.

The Senate begins debate on repeal of Section 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Labor Act. Opponents of repeal start a filibuster to halt the measure.

Jan. 26—The President sends Congress a six year, \$2.3 billion plan to rebuild slum neighborhoods in 70 cities.

Jan. 27—The President's Annual Economic Report is sent to Congress. It predicts continued rapid economic growth but warns of the dangers of inflation.

Labor

Jan. 1—New York City's first mass-transit strike stops subways and busses after Michael J. Quill, Transport Worker Union president, rejects a \$25 million settlement offer from the Transit Authority.

Jan. 3—The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen announces it will seek a 25 per cent basic wage increase from 190 railroads, effective Feb. 2.

President Michael Quill and eight other leaders of the striking N.Y. transit workers are found guilty of civil contempt of court for violating an injunction against striking.

Jan. 4—Quill is jailed after refusing to obey a court order to end the transit strike. Two hours later he collapses with a possible heart attack and is removed to Bellevue Hospital.

Jan. 7—President Johnson announces that the federal government will grant low interest loans to individuals and small businessmen hurt by the N.Y. transit strike.

The Labor Department reports that unemployment last month fell to 4.1 per cent.

Jan. 13—The N.Y. transit strike ends with union officials and the Transit Authority agreeing to settlement terms offered by a special mediation panel. Mayor John Lindsay sets the settlement cost at \$52 million over a two-year period; the Transit Au

thority says \$60 million, and the union, \$70 million.

President Johnson denounces as inflationary the settlement terms of the N.Y. transit strike.

Jan. 28—Michael Quill dies of a heart attack.

Military

Jan. 11—A Justice Department official takes issue with General Hershey's position that students may properly be reclassified 1-A if they demonstrate illegally against the draft. The Justice Department maintains that such demonstrations should be punished under the general laws rather than by the draft laws.

Jan. 25—Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara defends his cutback on strategic bombers before a House armed services subcommittee. He asserts that even without bombers, the Pentagon's planned missile force will be more than enough to inflict "an unacceptable degree of destruction" on "both the Soviet Union and Communist China simultaneously."

Jan. 28—Selective Service Director Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey announces that beginning in September, 1966, tests and class standing will be resumed as criteria for deferment of college students from military service.

Politics

Jan. 4—Movie actor Ronald Reagan announces his candidacy for the Republican gubernatorial nomination in California.

Jan. 17—The leading Republican congressional leaders deliver their own televised "State of the Union" message. Senate minority leader Dirksen and House minority leader Gerald Ford declare that many domestic programs can be cut to help finance the Vietnam war.

Supreme Court

Jan. 17—The Supreme Court forbids the city of Macon, Georgia, from withdrawing as a trustee of a park to allow the park, as

a "private" facility, to discriminate against Negroes.

Jan. 19—The Supreme Court refuses to apply retroactively its 1965 ruling that state judges and prosecutors may not comment on a defendant's refusal to testify in his own behalf.

UPPER VOLTA

Jan. 2—President Maurice Yameogo declares a state of emergency and bans a strike scheduled for tomorrow against his austerity measures.

Jan. 4—Following three days of riots against the government, the army chief-of-staff, Lieutenant Colonel Sangoule Lamizana, seizes control. The deposed president tells the nation he "rejoices" at the settlement.

VATICAN, THE

Jan. 1—Pope Paul VI sends New Year's appeals to the chiefs-of-state of the Soviet Union, Communist China, North and South Vietnam and the U.S. urging them to work for a Vietnam peace.

Jan. 29—Pope Paul VI recommends that neutral nations sponsor arbitration of the Vietnamese conflict under the auspices of the U.N. and commends the "peace offensive," in an apparent reference to the U.S. efforts to open negotiation.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See also *U.S.S.R.* and *U.S. Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 4—The government acknowledges for the first time the suspension of air raids on its territory and denounces the cessation as a U.S. trick.

Jan. 7—A high-level Soviet delegation, headed by A. N. Shelepin, arrives in Hanoi.

Jan. 9—A. N. Shelepin declares that the U.S. has failed to show it wishes peace, and is interested only in expanding the conflict. He asserts the U.S.S.R. backs Hanoi's conditions for peace talks.

Jan. 16—The official newspaper, *Nhan Dan*,

asserts there can be no peace discussions with the U.S. while it maintains its commitments to the Saigon government.

Jan. 29—In a letter dated January 24 and made public today, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh terms U.S. offers of unconditional peace discussions “an effort to fool public opinion,” and describes President Johnson’s State of the Union statement that the U.S. will not retreat from Vietnam as an “impudent threat.”

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Jan. 1—U.S. Army sources report that in 1965, 1,350 American fighting men were killed in Vietnam, 5,300 wounded and 148 missing or captured.

Jan. 2—For the first time, U.S. combat troops move into the Mekong Delta, where Vietcong have been disrupting harvest activities.

Jan. 8—Informed sources report that U.S. jet pilots, during the lull in the bombing of North Vietnam, have been having “excellent results” from massive raids on the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” through eastern Laos, by which North Vietnam has been supplying Vietcong forces.

Jan. 11—A U.S. military spokesman says that American troops operating along the Cambodian border have uncovered evidence that a North Vietnam antiaircraft battalion has been infiltrated into the south. This is the first such instance of the war.

Vietcong sources in Algiers hint strongly the Vietcong might drop its demands for U.S. troop withdrawals prior to peace negotiations if the U.S. agrees to negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam.

Jan. 15—Premier Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky promises that the nation will have a new constitution by October and national elections in 1967. He tells the nation that the emphasis of his government this year will be on “pacification” and “reconstruction” in hostile parts of the countryside.

The defense ministry orders all government military units to observe a cease-fire

during the celebration of Tet, the Vietnam lunar New Year, to extend from noon January 20 to 6 p.m. January 23.

Vietcong forces are ordered to undertake no offensive operations against the South Vietnam troops between midnight January 19 and midnight January 23.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk arrives in Saigon to confer with government leaders on the U.S. peace offensive. Informed sources indicate that Saigon officials are alarmed about any possible peace talks. Following the talks, Premier Ky declares that “no other nation is qualified and able to decide on our destiny, independence of our own will.”

Jan. 17—The U.S. formally announces it will honor the lunar New Year cease-fire proposed by the Vietcong and accepted with modifications, by the South Vietnamese.

Jan. 18—Premier Ky hints that “a small group of people” is attempting to overthrow his seven-month-old government.

U.S. military officials announce that 7,000 combat troops have been added to U.S. forces, making the total American force in Vietnam nearly 190,000.

Jan. 19—Informed sources say the government has arrested from 10 to 50 junior military officers and a former general in an move to avert a plot against the Ky regime.

Jan. 21—Military sources indicate that the Vietcong has violated the New Year truce at least 49 times; violations are mainly minor.

Jan. 22—Chief-of-State Major General Nguyen Van Thieu tells a military and civilian delegation that U.S. and South Vietnam planes are bombing the “Ho Chi Minh” trail in eastern Laos.

ZAMBIA

Jan. 2—President Kenneth Kaunda rejects Rhodesia’s offer to restore oil supplies.

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